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CITIZENS UNITED ROUND 11: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
DISCLOSURE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND EXPANDING
EXEMPTIONS AND LOOPHOLES FOR CORPORATE
INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS
ABSTRACT
In the wake of Citizens United, campaign finance regulation is in a
state of flux. Disclosure regulations have rightfully taken the spotlight as
a last means of regulating the influence of money on politics. With
spending likely to reach record highs in the 2016 election cycle and the
percentage of undisclosed spending continuing to rise, disclosure regula-
tions are increasingly important. Reforms, however, are necessary to
protect the important purpose of providing the electorate with infor-
mation regarding who is attempting to influence its votes and to ensure
the effectiveness of such disclosures.
This comment argues the Tenth Circuit, through its recent decision
in Citizens United v. Gessler, further degraded the current campaign fi-
nance regulation scheme by creating yet another avenue for organiza-
tions to avoid disclosure. By granting Citizens United a media exemp-
tion, the court opened the door to endless challenges on a case-by-case
basis. Consequently, the court posed the significant risk of expanding the
set of existing loopholes to an uncontrollable level. Without proper re-
forms on both the federal and state level, these loopholes and exemptions
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INTRODUCTION
As one of the preeminent rights of democratic theory, the Judiciary
considers the freedom of speech as "the touchstone of individual liber-
ty,"' characterized by Justice Cardozo as "the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."2 "The First Amend-
ment affords the broadest protection to . . . political expression . . . 'to
assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas . . . . and "[d]iscussion of
1. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.2 (5th ed. 2013). Freedom of expression is one of the basic prin-
ciples that our system of government is founded on. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 896 (1963) ("It represents, indeed, one of the
major contributions of our political system to the democratic way of life.").
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (applying the First Amendment to the
3. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957)), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United v. FEC (Citizens United l), 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Justice Brennan coined this phrase,
which would come to be quoted as the objective of protecting political speech, based on a letter of
the Continental Congress in 1774. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 ("The last right we shall mention, regards
the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Govern-
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public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates,' which are
integral to the system of government established by the United States
Constitution.5 Consequently, the freedom of speech afforded by the First
Amendment has sparked bitter public controversy throughout history.
Campaign finance laws that seek to impose limits and restrictions on
spending-both through contributions and expenditures-and the corre-
sponding disclaimer and disclosure regulations frequently implicate such
freedoms. More recently, First Amendment protections have given rise
to new challenges in the campaign finance arena predominately by non-
profit corporations regarding disclosure regulations.8
This Comment argues the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals's recent
decision in Citizens United v. Gessler (Citizens United II)9 was wrongly
decided. In its decision, the court granted the nonprofit advocacy group a
preliminary injunction against Colorado's campaign finance disclosure
regulations finding that it qualified for media exemption.10 By granting
Citizens United a media exemption, the court opened the door to addi-
tional opportunities for avoiding campaign finance disclosure, which
undermines the purposes and diminishes the effectiveness of such regula-
tions.
Part I of this Comment traces the history of campaign finance laws
and the major decisions that shaped the current campaign finance land-
scape leading up to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Citizens United II.
Part II provides a brief summary of the facts of Citizens United II, as
well as the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III analyz-
es how the court's expansion of the media exemption creates an addi-
tional avenue for entities to avoid disclosure and the corresponding im-
plications. Finally, Part IV considers campaign finance disclosure reform
models and proposes a balanced approach. The proposed reforms incor-
porate aggregated data concerning small donors, higher thresholds and
ment, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of
union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable
and just modes of conducting affairs." (quoting I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108
(1774))).
4. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
5. Id. Buckley, the landmark case that deemed provisions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, unconstitutional marks the beginning of the modem
era of campaign finance jurisprudence. Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The
Challenges for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC,
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 329, 351 (2012).
6. See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Applica-
tion of Campaign Finance Laws-Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1 (2007) (collecting and
discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases in which the Court considered campaign finance laws that
were challenged on First Amendment grounds).
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Gessler, 71 F. Supp. 3d. 1194, 1195, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) (seek-
ing declaratory judgment and injunctive relief regarding reporting and disclosure requirements for
electioneering communication under Colorado law based on First Amendment protections).
9. 773 F.3d 200 (10th Cir. 2014).
10. Id. at 219.
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more comprehensive disclosure of large donor information, increased
disclosure of "social welfare" organization and super PAC donors, and
refined standards regarding earmarking and media exemptions to effec-
tively address the loopholes provided by current disclosure laws.
I. BACKGROUND
Out of concern that corporations posed problems for democracy,
campaign finance laws restricting corporate participation in electoral
politics have existed since the late 1800s.11 These laws have evolved into
a complex set of regulations concerning campaign contributions, expend-
itures, and corresponding disclosures and disclaimers in an attempt to
lessen the impact of the almighty dollar on political power.'2 This Part
first discusses the history of campaign finance laws and First Amend-
ment challenges. Second, it explores the marked change in First
Amendment jurisprudence through the landmark decision in Citizens
United v. FEC (Citizens United I)13 and its progeny. Next, this Part ex-
amines legislation in response to Citizens United I and, lastly, it consid-
ers recent challenges to campaign finance disclosure laws leading up to
the Tenth Circuit's shift in Citizens UnitedII.
A. Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment
The battle between corporate interests in participating in electoral
politics and governmental interests in limiting the influence of wealth on
elections has resulted in a constantly evolving body of campaign finance
laws on behalf of the Legislature and shifting First Amendment jurispru-
dence on behalf of the Judiciary. History reveals changing viewpoints
with recent developments reflecting the Judiciary's growing partiality for
the deregulation of campaign finance and stronger protection for First
Amendment rights.
1. Initial Legislation
In response to increased corporate spending and in fear of wealth's
potential power over politics, Congress first banned contributions from
corporations to federal candidates through the Tillman Act of 1907,14 and
I1. Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10
ELECTION L.J. 337, 339 (2011) (discussing the history of campaign finance laws and corporate
spending in elections).
12. See id. at 339-40 ("The ban on the use of corporate treasury funds in election campaigns
is based on the idea that corporations pose a special problem for democracy.").
13. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
14. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006),
transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30118). The Act made it unlawful for:
[A]ny national bank, or any corporation ... to make a [money] contribution or expendi-
ture in connection with any election to any political office . . . or for any corporation
whatever ... to make a [money] contribution . .. in connection with any election at
which [P]residential and [V]ice [P]residential electors or a Senator or Representative
in . .. Congress are to be voted for . . . .
752 [Vol. 93:3
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over the next twenty years many states followed.5 In 1925, Congress
enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which mandated that
certain information about contributions to presidential campaign commit-
tees be reported.'6 In upholding these disclosure requirements, the Su-
preme Court concluded that the disclosure of political contributions
would "prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections."n Years
later, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 expanded the federal contribution ban
to apply to labor unions' independent spending.'8 Similarly, approxi-
mately two-dozen states enacted legislation prohibiting corporate spend-
ing in support of or in opposition to election candidates.'9 This focus on
regulating corporate spending through campaign finance laws was born
out of the idea that corporations were able to aggregate wealth, symbol-
ized as corporate "war chests," and that their "special 'advantages' in the
legal realm may translate into special advantages in the market for legis-
lation."20
Following financing scandals in elections and based on concerns re-
garding the effects of the "spiraling costs of election campaigns,"21 Con-
gress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Three
years later, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974 add-
ed more stringent disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and estab-
lished the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as the administrative and
Id. at 864-65. President Theodore Roosevelt supported reform after controversy arose regarding his
campaign funding, the majority of which was comprised of large donations from corporations.
Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After Citizens Unit-
ed, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1035-36 (2011).
15. Briffault, supra note I1, at 339 (citing EARL R. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT-
PRACTICES LEGISLATION 127-28 (1928)). New York was the first state to pass a disclosure law that
required candidates to disclose their contribution sources and campaign expenditure recipients. See
Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How
2012 Became the "Dark Money" Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 383, 400
(2013) (citing An Act to Amend Title Five of the Penal Code Relating to Crimes Against the Elec-
tive Franchise, 1890 N.Y. Laws 265 § 41(d)). Shortly thereafter, Colorado, Michigan, Massachu-
setts, California, Missouri, and Kansas enacted similar legislation. Id. (citing LOUISE OVERACKER,
MONEY IN ELECTIONS 289, 291-94 (1932)). By 1927, campaign disclosure laws had been enacted
by all but three states. Id.
16. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-48, repealed by Pub. L. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 20 (1972) (requiring
presidential campaign committees to report information, including names and addresses of contribu-
tors, to the clerk of the House of Representatives).
17. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934).
18. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 159
(1947) (codified as amended by 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012)).
19. See Life After Citizens United, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx (last
updated Jan. 4, 2011). Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming enacted
laws banning political activity by both corporations and unions. Id.
20. See Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 471 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
659 (1990), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
21. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 1, § 20.51(a).
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enforcement agency.22 In addition, FECA provided the framework for
political action committees (PACs), which allowed for federal campaign
donations from corporations and unions through segregated funds.2 3 The
United States Supreme Court considered First Amendment challenges to
central provisions of FECA shortly after its amendment in the seminal
case Buckley v. Valeo.24
2. Early First Amendment Jurisprudence Regarding Campaign Fi-
nance
Buckley set the stage for the concept that "money talks."25 The opin-
ion depended upon the precept that the inherent relation between cam-
paign contributions and expenditures and speech placed First Amend-
ment restrictions on funding regulations.26 The Court distinguished cam-
paign contributions from campaign expenditures reasoning that the cor-
responding speech interests warranted limitations on contributions but
not on expenditures.27 Additionally, the Court held that disclosure re-
quirements must survive exacting scrutiny,28 which requires finding a
"substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the infor-
mation required" by the disclosure to justify infringing on First Amend-
ment rights.29 The governmental interests validated by the Court were
three-fold: first, disclosure provides the electorate with information that
aids voters in evaluating candidates; second, disclosure deters corruption
and the appearance of corruption; and third, disclosure aids in the detec-
tion of contribution limit violations.30 Regarding the potential burdens on
First Amendment rights that disclosure could invoke, the Buckley Court
22. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 8, amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263; see S.
Rep. No. 93-689, 93rd Cong., at 1743 (1974) ("There is no question that the public appreciates the
pervasive evils of our present system for campaign financing. The potentials for abuse are all too
clear. Americans are looking to Congress for comprehensive, effective reform, not for halfway
measures that only reach a small part of the problem or which may make some present problems
even worse.").
23. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 302(a)-(O, 86 Stat. 3, 12
(1972) (laying out the proper organization of political committees).
24. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93
(2003), overruledby Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens Unitedl), 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
25. See id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. See id. at 19-23 (majority opinion) (discussing the potential impacts that limitations on
campaign contributions would have on speech).
27. See id. ("In sum, although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both impli-
cate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more
severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limita-
tions on financial contributions.").
28. Id. at 64-66 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958)) (reasoning that exact-
ing scrutiny "is necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing
the exercise of First Amendment rights").
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 66-68 (relying on Congressional records that discussed the different governmental
interests in disclosure).
754 [Vol. 93:3
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assessed previous decisions31 in crafting an exemption that would be
applicable where a party could demonstrate a "reasonable probability"
that disclosure would result in "threats, harassment, or reprisals."32
Two years after Buckley, the Court in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti33 struck down a Massachusetts law banning corporate spend-
ing in support of or in opposition to ballot propositions.34 The Bellotti
Court opined that the value of speech "in terms of its capacity for in-
forming the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual,"35 raising doubts
about the constitutionality of the corporate contribution ban. Neverthe-
less, these doubts did not surface until more than thirty years later. 36 Ra-
ther, the Court addressed the ability of corporations to make campaign
expenditures, not contributions.3 7 In FEC v. National Right to Work
Committee (NR WC),38 the Court upheld a federal law that restricted non-
stock corporations from soliciting contributions from nonmembers.39 In
its decision, the Court found the corrupting effects of large financial con-
tributions and the corresponding erosion of public confidence justified
the restrictions on corporate contributions, the requirement that corpora-
tions use PACs, and the restrictions on solicitations to fund PACs.40
Shortly thereafter, in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL)41 the Court distinguished the special advantages of the corporate
structure from nonprofit corporations formed expressly for the purpose
of promoting political ideas, that have no shareholders, and that do not
31. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (holding an ordinance that prohibited
distribution of anonymous handbills was unconstitutional as abridging the freedom of speech and
press because the "fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance"); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 517-18, 523-24, 527 (1960)
(reversing convictions for failure to comply with an ordinance requiring disclosure of contributions,
"by whom and when paid," because the disclosure "would work a significant interference with the
freedom of association of their members .. . [who] had been followed by harassment and threats of
bodily harm"); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-63, 466 (holding that a production order compelling disclo-
sure of the organization's membership was a denial of due process as a restraint upon the freedom of
association because the organization had "made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostili-
ty").
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74 (discussing examples of evidence that would provide sufficient
proof to invoke the exemption and concluding that a blanket exemption was not required).
33. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id. at 777.
36. See generally Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (relying heavily on the Bellotti
opinion in reasoning that the corporation contribution bans were unconstitutional).
37. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775-95.
38. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. Id. at 201-02, 207, 209-10 ("[T]he 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities
'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process."'
(quoting Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981))).
41. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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accept contributions from business corporations or labor unions.42 The
Court reasoned that these attributes "prevent[] such corporations from
serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to
the political marketplace."A In so doing, the Court held the FECA re-
strictions on independent spending were unconstitutional as applied to
the nonprofit, non-stock corporation and, consequently, created an ex-
ception for similar entities.44
3. A Shift Toward Stronger Restrictions on Campaign Finance
Applying similar reasoning as in NRWC and MCFL, the Court in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce45 upheld a Michigan law that
prohibited corporate independent expenditures in support of or in opposi-
tion to candidates based on "the corrosive and distorting effects of im-
mense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's sup-
port for the corporation's political ideas."4 6 The Court reasoned that,
despite its status as a nonprofit, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce did
not fall under the MCFL exception because most of its funding came
from business corporations emphasizing the exception's narrow applica-
tion.47 Moreover, the Court found the laws' media exemption from dis-
closure requirements justified the compelling purpose of "informing and
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for dis-
cussion and debate."4 8 Although the Court recognized that this unique
role did not "entitle the press to greater protection under the Constitu-
tion,"49 it also distinguished the press by recognizing its involvement "in
the regular business of imparting news to the public." 0
Two cases challenging the constitutionality of state disclosure laws
followed in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission5 1 and Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF).52 McIntyre involved a
law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature and an
42. Id. at 264.
43. Id. at 264-65 ("[The] government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to
meet the particular problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the
danger that has prompted regulation.").
44. See id. at 263-64.
45. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
46. Id. at 660.
47. See id at 661-65 (finding the Chamber's purposes were not inherently political, the
Chamber lacked shareholders, but its "members are more similar to shareholders of a business cor-
poration than to the members of MCFL," and was greatly influenced by business corporations as
more than three-quarters of its members were business corporations).
48. Id. at 666-68 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978)).
49. Id. at 668.
50. See id (reasoning that the restriction, if applied to the news media, "might discourage
incorporated news broadcasters or publishers from serving their crucial societal role" and that the
"exception ensures that the Act does not hinder or prevent the institutional press from reporting on,
and publishing editorials about, newsworthy events").
51. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
52. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
756 [Vol. 93:3
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unsigned leaflet regarding a ballot initiative.53 Produced with personal
funds, the leaflet focused solely on a proposed tax levy.5 4 ACLF involved
a law that required individuals circulating petitions regarding a proposed
ballot initiative to wear identification badges that included the individu-
al's name and status as a paid or unpaid volunteer. By finding the in-
formation required by the disclosure regulations provided little value to
the voters' education and decision-making regarding the elections, while
posing the threat of discouraging political activity, the Court struck down
the disclosure laws as unconstitutional.6
Despite the holdings of McIntyre and ACLF, campaign finance dis-
closure continued to serve the important governmental interest of inform-
ing the electorate in the eyes of both the Judiciary and the Legislature.
To further "purge national politics of what [was] conceived to be the
pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions,"58 Congress
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which
contained several amendments to FECA.59 By redefining what campaign
activity was subject to regulation, the BCRA expanded Buckley's "'mag-
ic words' of express advocacy."60 Specifically, Buckley determined that
"funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate," or express advocacy, was the
kind of campaign expenditures that FECA applied to.6 1
Consequently, the words used as examples of advocacy language,
such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "defeat," and "reject" became the
53. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
54. Id.
55. ACLF, 525 U.S. at 200.
56. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348, 355-57 ("The simple interest in providing voters with
additional relevant information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or
disclosures she would otherwise omit."); see also ACLF, 525 U.S. at 197-200. "Listing paid circula-
tors and their income from circulation 'forc[es] paid circulators to surrender the anonymity enjoyed
by their volunteer counterparts,' no more than tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure
serves .... " Id. at 204 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Am. Constitutional Law
Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997)).
57. See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 992 (2011) (noting that the Supreme
Court easily upheld disclosure laws following McIntyre and ACLF).
58. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003) (quoting United States v. Int'l Union United
Auto., Aircraft & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)), overruled by Citi-
zens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
59. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.) (declar-
ing that it was "[a]n Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide bipartisan
campaign reform"). The BCRA, commonly known as McCain-Feingold, also sought to eliminate
"soft money" from political campaigns. Jason M. Shepard, Campaigning as the Press: Citizens
United and the Problem of Press Exemptions in Law, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y 137, 140
(2010-11).
60. See Briffault, supra note 11, at 342-43 (discussing the ability to easily evade FECA's
disclosure requirements under the express advocacy standard and Buckley's "magic words").
61. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976) (per curiam) (footnote omitted), superseded by
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized
in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2016] 57
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"magic words" of express advocacy and created a separate category of
campaign activity exempt from regulation known as "issue advocacy."62
The BCRA expanded the scope of express advocacy by defining a new
category termed "electioneering communications" as "(i) broadcast, ca-
ble or satellite communications (ii) that refer to a clearly identified can-
didate, (iii) are targeted on that candidate's constituency, and (iv) are
aired within thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general
election in which that candidate is running."6 3 Additionally, the applica-
tion of FECA's disclosure requirements extended to such communica-
tions.
Shortly thereafter, McConnell v. FEC 5 involved a challenge to the
BCRA to no avail-the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ban on
corporate independent spending and the corresponding disclosure re-
quirements. McConnell officially closed the loophole between express
advocacy and issue advocacy by finding the BCRA's new category of
electioneering communications avoided vagueness and rectified Buck-
ley's "functionally meaningless" magic words requirement.67 The
McConnell Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the ban on corporate
and union campaign spending by finding that the ability to spend through
PACs provided corporations "sufficient opportunit[ies] to engage in ex-
press advocacy."68
4. The Pendulum Begins to Swing
A few years later, the departure of Justice O'Connor (who Justice
Alito succeeded) marked a drastic shift in campaign finance jurispru-
dence69 beginning with the Court's decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life, Inc. (WRTL).70 In WRTL, the Court reasoned that he corporate
spending ban could apply to the "functional equivalent of express advo-
cacy," which required a communication be "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
62. See id at 44 n.52; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 102-03 (discussing "issue advocacy").
63. Briffault, supra note I1, at 342-43 ("In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), Congress responded by defining a new category of campaign speech-'electioneering
communications'-for purposes of the ban on corporate and union campaign expenditures as well
for determining the scope of disclosure.").
64. Id. at 343.
65. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
66. Id. at 201-03, 219 (reasoning that because the disclosure requirements "d[id] not prevent
anyone from speaking," they were not unconstitutional (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003))).
67. See id at 193-94 ("[T]he presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully dis-
tinguish electioneering speech from a true issue ad.").
68. Id. at 203.
69. See Briffault, supra note 57, at 993 (discussing the "Supreme Court's campaign finance
U-tum" following the retirement of Justice O'Connor).
70. 551 U.S. 449, 481-82 (2007).
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candidate." 7' In adopting this test for as-applied challenges and holding
that the BCRA's electioneering communication definition was unconsti-
tutional as applied to WRTL's advertisements-financed with funds
from its general treasury-the Court narrowed the scope of the election-
eering communication's application and constricted McConnell's expan-
sive approach to prohibition72 setting the stage for Citizens United I.
B. Citizens United v. FEC and its Progeny
In the highly controversial opinion in Citizens United I, the Court
struck down the sixty-year federal ban on corporate independent expend-
itures in federal elections out of general treasury funds, overruling Austin
and overruling the portion of McConnell that upheld the BCRA's elec-
tioneering communications provisions.73 Citizens United, a nonprofit
corporation, sought exemption for its film, Hillary: The Movie, from
classification as an electioneering communication and from the required
disclosures.74 The majority opinion noted the complexity of campaign
finance regulation and opined that the FEC was controlling what political
speech could become public.75 Based on the burdensome nature of PACs,
the Court declared the option to form PACs did not sufficiently allow
corporations to speak and, therefore, the prohibition on corporate inde-
pendent expenditures constituted an outright ban on speech.76
The Court relied heavily on Buckley and Bellotti in overruling Aus-
tin and stressed that "[p]olitical speech is 'indispensible to decisionmak-
ing in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual.'"77 Addressing the media
exemption, the Court noted that media corporations similarly amass large
amounts of wealth through the advantages of the corporate form in find-
ing the law invalid. Moreover, the Court stated differential treatment of a
media corporation and some other corporation cannot comport with the
First Amendment.78 The Court did, however, uphold the disclosure and
disclaimer requirements based on the importance of transparency.79 Alt-
71. Id at 466-67, 469-70 (stating that such communications would be considered the "func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate").
72. See id. at 460, 476-82. Rather than interpreting "electioneering communication[s]" as
those "that refer to a clearly identified candidate," the Court returned to the narrower express advo-
cacy interpretation of the years prior to the enactment of the BCRA as an "appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate." Id. at 469-70, 484 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(a) (2000)).
73. See Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66, 372 (2010).
74. Id. at 319-21.
75. Id. at 335-36 (stating that the "FEC has created a regime that allows it to select what
political speech is safe for public consumption" resulting in "an unprecedented governmental inter-
vention into the realm of speech").
76. Id. at 337-39.
77. Id. at 345-56 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
78. Id at 352-54.
79. Id. at 371 ("[T]ransparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give
proper weight to different speakers and messages."). Only Justice Thomas dissented from the hold-
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hough such requirements may impose burdens on speakers, the majority
opined they serve the interest of providing the electorate with infor-
mation without imposing a ceiling on campaign activity or preventing
anyone from speaking.80 Accordingly, the Court held the requirements
survived the exacting scrutiny standard and thus did not violate the First
Amendment.8 1
A decision out of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit further shifted the campaign finance landscape in
SpeechNow.org v. FEC (SpeechNow).8 2 The court held that limits on
contributions to organizations that intended to make only independent
expenditures were unconstitutional because such spending does not pose
sufficient risks of corruption.8 3 As a result, the super PAC was born,
which would lead to significant increases in corporate spending.84 None-
theless, the court upheld the reporting and disclosure requirements as
imposing a minimal burden on speech compared to the important interest
of the public "in knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is
funding that speech."85
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in Doe v. Reed8 6 concluded
the disclosure of names and addresses of petition signers, who sought to
subject legislation that extended "all but marriage" benefits to same-sex
couples to a voter referendum, served the state's interest of preserving
the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, discovering
invalid signatures, and also by promoting accountability in elections.8 7
Justice Thomas was the sole dissenter,8 8 but five Justices wrote concur-
ring opinions focusing on the reasonable probability of harassment
ing that the disclosure and disclaimer requirements were constitutional. See id at 480-85 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 366 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized
in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United l, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
81. Id. at 367-71.
82. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
83. Id. at 689, 695-96 ("[B]ecause Citizens United holds that independent expenditures do not
corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law, then the government can have no
anticorruption interest in limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only organizations.").
84. See, e.g., Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra note 5, at 338.
85. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 698.
86. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
87. Id. at 192-93, 197-99.
88. See id. at 228-29 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("In my view, compelled disclosure of signed
referendum and initiative petitions . .. severely burdens those rights and chills citizen participation
in the referendum process. Given those burdens, I would hold that Washington's decision to subject
all referendum petitions to public disclosure is unconstitutional because there will always be a less
restrictive means by which Washington can vindicate its stated interest in preserving the integrity of
its referendum process." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
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standard for exemption,89 with only Justice Alito calling for a lower evi-
dentiary burden.90
The Supreme Court again narrowed the importance of regulating
campaign finance in McCutcheon v. FEC91 by striking down the aggre-
gate limits on contributions made to candidates, parties, and connected
political committees in federal elections.92 The Court reiterated that the
only interest in protecting against actual or apparent corruption is that of
quid pro quo corruption, a distinction that was emphasized in Citizens
United J.93 In its 5-4 decision, however, the Court opined that disclosure
presents less restrictions on speech than contribution bans and provides
the public with information while deterring corruption by exposing large
donations.94
C. Legislation in Response to Citizens United v. FEC
In response to the Citizens United I decision, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill entitled Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting
Light on Spending in Elections, known as the DISCLOSE Act." This
Act increased disclosure of corporate and organizational independent
expenditures by providing for the following:
(i) disclosure of donations to nonprofits earmarked for electoral use,
(ii) the creation of an optional Campaign Related Activity Account
(CRAA) as the exclusive account for campaign spending and the dis-
closure of only donations above a high $6,000 threshold to the op-
tional CRAA, (iii) a mechanism for donors to nonprofits to provide
that their funds will not be used for electoral purposes; and (iv) a re-
quirement that if a nonprofit does not create a CRAA and undertakes
independent expenditures or electioneering communications that all
donations of $600 or more to the organization would be subject to
89. See id at 202 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 212 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg); id. at 230 (Stevens, J., concurring) (joined by Justice
Breyer); id. at 219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 202-04, 212 (Alito, J., concurring) ("As-applied challenges to disclosure require-
ments play a critical role in protecting First Amendment freedoms. To give speech the breathing
room it needs to flourish, prompt judicial remedies must be available well before the relevant speech
occurs and the burden of proof must be low.").
91. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
92. Id. at 1448, 1456-57, 1462 ("An aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees
an individual may support through contributions is not a 'modest restraint' at all. The Government
may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspa-
per how many candidates it may endorse.").
93. Id. at 1441 ("Any regulation must instead target what we have called 'quid pro quo'
corruption or its appearance." (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010))).
94. Id. at 1459-60 (recognizing that disclosure "offers a particularly effective means of arm-
ing the voting public with information" and at the same time can "deter actual corruption and avoid
the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publici-
ty" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))).
95. See generally Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
(DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, 111 th Cong. (2010).
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disclosure except for contributions from donors who had expressly
directed that their donations not be used for electoral purposes.96
One commentator has suggested that because the CRAA presents
attributes similar to a PAC and Citizens United I determined that corpo-
rations cannot be compelled to funnel their campaign spending through
PACs, it would likely be subject to constitutional challenges. Even so,
the complex and controversial DISCLOSE Act was never enacted after
the Senate filibustered twice.
98
In similar fashion, a number of states responded to Citizens United I
by repealing or re-writing campaign finance laws.99 In the Tenth Circuit,
upon the request of Governor Bill Ritter to determine the constitutionali-
ty of two provisions of the Colorado Constitution that Citizens United I
put into question, the Colorado Supreme Court held the provisions were
unconstitutional.100 Moreover, the Colorado legislature enacted Senate
Bill 10-203, which requires corporations and labor unions to register
election campaign donations, including the identity of the donor and the
amount of the donation, with an independent agency.'0' Under the Bill,
corporations and labor unions are able to make expenditures expressly
advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate and to make contribu-
tions for electioneering communications.102
Although corporations may contribute to political committees, they
are prohibited from making direct corporate contributions to candidate
committees and political parties. o3 Corporations that are formed to pro-
96. Briffault, supra note 57, at 1011 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. (proposing a solution based on the DISCLOSE Act that the author argues would be
constitutional, although it would likely face constitutional challenges).
98. See Rosalind S. Helderman, DISCLOSE Act, New Donor Transparency Law, Blocked in
Senate, WASH. POST (July 16, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/disclose-act-new-donor-transparency-law-
blocked-in-senate/2012/07/16/gJQAbm7WpW blog.html; see also Ted Barrett, Senate Republicans
Block DISCLOSE Act for Second Straight Day, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/politics/senate-disclose-act/ (last updated July 17, 2012).
99. See NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 19 ("In 17 of the 24 states with laws
affected by the Citizens United decision, legislation has been introduced to amend the law.").
100. In re Interrogatories Propounded by Governor Ritter, Jr., Concerning Effect of Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) on Certain Provisions of Article XXIII of Constitution of State
(In re Interrogatories), 227 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2010).
101. S. 10-203, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ I-
45-107.5, -109, -111.5 (2016).
102. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 1-45-107.5(2).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103.7; COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(a) (2015) (held un-
constitutional) ("It shall be unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make contributions to
a candidate committee or a political party, and to make expenditures expressly advocating the elec-
tion or defeat of a candidate; except that a corporation or labor organization may establish a political
committee or small donor committee which may accept contributions or dues from employees,
officeholders, shareholders, or members.") Only the expenditure was held unconstitutional by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In re Interrogatories, 227 P.3d at 894 ("To the extent section
3(4) ... makes it unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make expenditures expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, it violates the dictates of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution . . . .").
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mote political ideas, however, are exempt from this restriction.' Several
other states have enacted similar legislation in the wake of Citizens Unit-
ed I.05 This new legislation, particularly the disclosure requirements, has
been subject to First Amendment challenges since its enactment.06
D. Recent Challenges to Campaign Finance Disclosure in the Tenth Cir-
cuit
Soon after Citizens United I, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
two nonprofit corporations that were formed to educate youth about po-
litical issues, including healthcare, campaign finance, the economy, and
voting records of governmental representatives, constituted political
committees.0 7 In determining the applicable reporting and disclosure
requirements under New Mexico law, the court also addressed whether
the corporations' mailers that criticized several incumbent state legisla-
tors constituted express advocacy or its functional equivalent. os Because
the organizations were not under the control of a political candidate, the
court applied the "major purpose" test to determine whether the organi-
zations operated primarily for a political purpose.109
An entity's major purpose can be determined by either examining
its central organizational purpose or through a comparison of its elec-
tioneering spending with its overall spending."0 Where contributions for
express advocacy or to candidates represent a preponderance of the or-
ganization's expenditures, the major purpose is deemed political."' The
court found that neither were satisfied and also recognized that a small
dollar amount of expenditures could not constitutionally serve as a trig-
ger, standing alone, for classification as a political committee.'1 2 Coupled
with the implications of Citizens United I, this classification would in-
creasingly degrade the effectiveness of campaign finance regulations and
serve as a loophole to disclosure regimes.1 3
In Free Speech v. FEC,114 the Tenth Circuit subsequently upheld the
FEC's disclaimer and disclosure requirements as necessary to provide
voters with information and "the transparency that 'enables the electorate
104. COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(b)(l)-(III) (2015). This exception refers to corporations
like Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. See generally FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),
479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
105. See NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 19 (stating that Alaska, Arizona, Con-
necticut, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia laws enacted in response to
Citizens United I are very similar to Colorado's law).
106. See discussion infra Section 1.D.
107. See N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 671 (10th Cir. 2010).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 677.
110. Id. at 678.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 678-79 (discussing the court's previous reasoning and holding in Colorado Right to
Life Committee, Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007)).
113. See discussion infra Section IlI.B.
114. 720 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2013).
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to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers
and messages.""'5 In addition, the court reasoned that the FEC's func-
tional equivalent and major purpose tests were essential in determining
whether an organization would be subject to the reporting, disclaimer,
and disclosure requirements, which it found to be more important after
Citizens United .1'16
The Tenth Circuit carved out another potential avenue for avoidance
of disclosure in Sampson v. Buescher,117 which involved a campaign
committee that formed only to oppose the annexation of a neighbor-
hood.'18 In Sampson, the court held that applying Colorado's campaign
reporting and disclosure requirements to such a committee violated the
members' rights to freedom of association.119 Applying exacting scruti-
ny,120 the court determined there was a legitimate interest in providing
the public with financial disclosures, but distinguished ballot issues from
candidate elections.1 21 The court found the burdens of the disclosure re-
quirements could not be justified by any governmental interest where a
ballot-initiative committee raises or expends a small amount of money,
which in this case was less than $1,000.122 The court, however, refused to
draw a bright-line to mark when contributions and expenditures need not
be reported by ballot-issue committees.123
In response to Sampson, the Secretary of State, Scott Gessler,
promulgated a rule increasing the contribution and expenditure threshold
for triggering the status of an issue committee from $200 to $5,000.124
Two election watch organizations petitioned for review challenging
Gessler's authority in passing the rule.125 The Colorado Supreme Court
held that Gessler acted beyond his authority and that, because the rule
115. Id. at 798 (quoting Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010)).
116. Id.
117. 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010).
118. Id. at l261.
119. Id.
120. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
121. See Sampson, 625 F.3d at 1256-59 (reasoning that the interest of facilitating detection of
violations was moot by the prohibition on contribution limitations regarding ballot-issues, the inter-
est of deterring corruption was irrelevant because "quid pro quo corruption cannot arise in a ballot-
issue campaign," and that the informational interest of reporting and disclosure requirements was
"significantly attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a single ballot issue and when
the contributions and expenditures are slight").
122. Id. at 1249, 1261.
123. Id. at 1261 ("We do not attempt to draw a bright line below which a ballot-issue commit-
tee cannot be required to report contributions and expenditures. The case before us is quite unlike
ones involving the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars on ballot issues presenting 'complex
policy proposals.' We say only that Plaintiffs' contributions and expenditures are well below the
line." (citation omitted) (quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th
Cir. 2003))).
124. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 327 P.3d 232, 233-34 (Colo. 2014).
125. Id. at 234.
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promulgated conflicted with provisions upheld in Sampson, the rule was
unlawful. 126
The Colorado Supreme Court's refusal to adopt a bright-line rule
became a point of frustration in Coalition for Secular Government v.
Gessler.127 The opinion declared the need to adjudicate the applicability
of Colorado's campaign finance disclosure laws on a case-by-case basis
"itself offends the First Amendment."l28 The court concluded that the
informational interest in mandating minimal to virtually nonexistent con-
tribution and expenditure disclosures could not justify the burdens that
compliance placed on speech and association rights.129 In doing so, the
court raised the issue surrounding small entities' ability to comply with
the detailed record keeping and administrative costs of disclosure obliga-
tions. 130 The court suggested the lack of established precedent in the
Tenth Circuit posed the risk of endless litigation in contradiction to the
intent of the disclosure requirements.'3 '
II. CITIZENS UNITED V. GESSLER
A. Facts
Citizens United is a Virginia non-stock corporation formed for the
principal purpose of promoting "traditional American values," such as
limited government, national sovereignty and security, the free market
economy, and strong families through grass roots efforts, advocacy, and
education.132 It has become well known for releasing documentaries that
address political and religious topics, which are produced by Citizens
United's in-house production and marketing arm Citizens United Produc-
tions. 133 Films are distributed through DVDs, television, online digital
streaming and downloading, and theatrical release; sold for retail and
wholesale bulk purchase; shown at movie theaters; licensed to television
broadcasters and digital streaming companies; and occasionally made
available for free screenings to educational institutions, the public, and
126. Id. at 235-38 (concluding that the court's as-applied remedy in Sampson did not render
the provisions unconstitutional on their face).




131. See id. at 1183 ("Unfortunately, given the Tenth Circuit's refusal 'to establish a bright line
below which a ballot issue committee cannot be required to report contributions and expenditures'
and the Supreme Court's election not to answer the certified questions, I must make a ruling on the
specific facts of this case based on what I determine, sui generis, to be reasonable. I say 'unfortu-
nately' because this state of affairs means that no precedent has been established and the stability
this matter of considerable public importance so needfully requires will have to await another day or
days and even more lawsuits." (quoting Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir.
2010))).
132. See Citizens United v. Gessler (Citizens United Hl), 773 F.3d 200, 202 (10th Cir. 2014);
see also Who We Are, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/who-we-are.aspx (last visit-
ed Feb. 3, 2016).
133. Citizens United I, 773 F.3d at 202.
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members of the news media.134 Citizens United "advertises its films on
television, in newspapers, on billboards, by electronic and regular mail,
and on the Internet."l35
Citizens United produced a film titled Rocky Mountain Heistl36
with plans for distribution throughout the United States "through DVD,
television broadcast, and online digital streaming and downloading," and
marketing through television, radio, and Internet advertisements.'3 7 The
documentary was scheduled for release in October 2014 ahead of the
Colorado General Election held on November 4, 2014. 38 Rocky Moun-
tain Heist and the advertisements promoting the film unambiguously
referred to elected Colorado officials running in the general election and
included footage of participants advocating for their election or defeat.,39
As a result, it fell under provisions of Colorado campaign laws that re-
quire disclosure in regard to such electioneering communications and
independent expenditures.140 In April 2014, Citizens United sought a
Declaratory Order with the Secretary of State (the Secretary) requesting a
ruling that Rocky Mountain Heist and its marketing be exempted from




136. The film focused on the "alleged impact of various advocacy groups on Colorado gov-




140. Id. Under Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution and the Fair Campaign Practices
Act (FCPA), an "[e]lectioneering communication" is defined as follows:
[A]ny communication broadcasted by television or radio, printed in a newspaper or on a
billboard, directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences or otherwise dis-
tributed that:
(1) Unambiguously refers to any candidate; and
(II) Is broadcasted, printed, mailed, delivered, or distributed within thirty days before a
primary election or sixty days before a general election; and
(Ill) Is broadcasted to, printed in a newspaper distributed to, mailed to, delivered by hand
to, or otherwise distributed to an audience that includes members of the electorate for
such public office.
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a) (2015); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9) (2016). An
"[e]xpenditure" is defined as follows:
[A]ny purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money by any
person for the purpose of expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate or
supporting or opposing a ballot issue or ballot question. An expenditure is made when the
actual spending occurs or when there is a contractual agreement requiring such spending
and the amount is determined.
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(8)(a); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(10). Further, Article
XXVIII and the FCPA define "[ijndependent expenditure [as] an expenditure that is not controlled
by or coordinated with any candidate or agent of such candidate." COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII,
§ 2(9); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(11).
141. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 207.
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B. Procedural History
In its request, Citizens United noted that it had been granted an ex-
emption from the disclosure provisions of FECAl 4 2 in an advisory opin-
ion issued by the FEC in June 2010.143 Citizens United used this exemp-
tion as support for its Petition for a Declaratory Order because the defini-
tions of electioneering communication and expenditure under the federal
statute are similar to Colorado's definitions.'4 Additionally, the press
exemption under the federal statute is comparable to the media exemp-
tions under Colorado law.145 Nonetheless, the Secretary denied Citizens
United's request and ruled that because it was not a broadcast facility,
Citizens United's film and advertising did not fall under the media ex-
emption.14 6 Further, the Secretary ruled that Citizens United's communi-
cations did not qualify for the regular-business exemption, which applies
142. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30126 (2012).
143. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 207 (citing FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL
3184266 (June 11, 2010)).
144. Id Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A)(i) (defining "electioneering communication" as
"any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office" and is made within "60 days before a general, special, or runoff election" in which
the candidate is seeking office or "30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention
or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate" in which the candidate is
seeking office, and where a communication "refers to a candidate for an office other than President
or Vice President [and] is targeted to the relevant electorate"), and 52 U.S.C. § 30101(9)(A) (defin-
ing "expenditure" to include "any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office" and any "written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure"), with
COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a), 2(8)(a), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9)-(l0).
145. Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(B)(i) (providing an exception from the definition of
electioneering communication for "a communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are
owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate"), and 52 U.S.C.
§ 30101(9)(B)(i) (providing an exemption from the definition of expenditure for "any news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any
political party, political committee, or candidate"), with COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(b)(I)-
(Ill), 2(8)(b)(l)-(IIl) (providing an exemption from the definition of electioneering communication
for "[a]ny news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commentary writings, or letters to the
editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned or controlled by a candidate
or political party" or "[a]ny editorial endorsements or opinions aired by a broadcast facility not
owned or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[alny communication by persons made in
the regular course and scope of their business or any communication made by a membership organi-
zation solely to members of such organization and their families" and providing an exemption from
the definition of "expenditure" for "[a]ny news articles, editorial endorsements, opinion or commen-
tary writings, or letters to the editor printed in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical not owned
or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[a]ny editorial endorsements or opinions aired by
a broadcast facility not owned or controlled by a candidate or political party" or "[s]pending by
persons, other than political parties, political committees and small donor committees, in the regular
course and scope of their business or payments by a membership organization for any communica-
tion solely to members and their families"), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-103(9)-(10) (providing
that the meaning of electioneering communication and expenditure is in accordance with COLO.
CONST. art. XXVIII, § 2(7), 2(8)).
146. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 208 (citing Suzanne Staiert, Deputy Sec'y of State, State of





to persons and businesses whose primary purpose is distributing con-
tent. 147
Following the Secretary's denial of its request, Citizens United
sought a preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado to enjoin the enforcement of the disclosure require-
ments.14 8 The action was brought against the Secretary to challenge the
disclosure provisions as violating the First Amendment, both facially and
as applied to Citizens United, because the provisions included media
exemptions.149 The district court denied the motion for preliminary in-
junction, and Citizens United appealed.50
C. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, authored by Circuit Judge Harris L. Hartz
and joined by Circuit Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich, the court declined
to address Citizens United's facial challenge and considered the district
court's denial of the preliminary injunction regarding the as-applied chal-
lenge under an abuse of discretion standard.'5 ' In considering the consti-
tutionality of Colorado's disclosure requirements, the court applied the
exacting scrutiny standard.152
First, the court found the disclosures relating to electioneering
communications and independent expenditures served the purpose of
"providing the electorate with information about the source of election-
related spending."'53 The court, however, rejected the Secretary's argu-
ment that anticorruption was an important governmental interest in re-
quiring the disclosure of independent expenditures.'54 In so doing, the
court distinguished coordinated contributions to candidates from inde-
pendent expenditures lacking such coordination because the latter present
147. Id. The Secretary relied on the court's interpretation of the regular-business exemption in
Colorado Citizens for Ethics in Government v. Committee for the American Dream, 187 P.3d 1207,
1216 (Colo. App. 2008). In this case, the court interpreted the exemption narrowly "as limited to
persons whose business is to broadcast, print, publicly display, directly mail, or hand deliver candi-
date-specific communications within the named candidate's district as a service, rather than to influ-
ence elections." Id. Thus, the exemption does not apply to those seeking to influence election out-
comes. Id. The court reasoned that because "[b]roadcasters and publishers do not seek to influence
elections as their primary objective, except where they are 'owned or controlled by a candidate or
political party,"' the reporting requirements are not applicable. Id (quoting COLO. CONST. art.
XXVIII, § 2(7)(b)(I)-(II)).
148. Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 202.
149. Id. at 202, 208.
150. Id at 208.
151. Id. at 202, 209 (holding that under the First Amendment, the Secretary must treat Citizens
United and the exempted media the same, which negated the need for the court to address the facial
challenge).
152. See discussion supra Section I.A.2. The exacting scrutiny standard requires finding "a
substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental
interest." Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 210 (quoting Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010)).
153. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 2 10.
154. Id. at 211.
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no risk of quid pro quo corruption and do not give rise to the appearance
of corruption.'55
Next, the court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens
United I in rejecting the Secretary's justification-that the First Amend-
ment provides greater protection for the press-for the media exemp-
tions.156 The court concluded that the Secretary could not rely on the
First Amendment to differentiate between the news media and other
speakers.157 The Secretary argued that the public's ability to evaluate a
message's credibility served as the line distinguishing "single-shot
speakers" with misleading names from the exempted media that perform
press functions, which provides context for the electorate.s58 The court
relied on factors that correlate with the public's opportunity to evaluate
the speaker, such as an extended period of time and regular intervals of
publication, to determine what provides context for evaluating messag-
es. 159
The court held that the Colorado government lacked a sufficiently
important interest to justify imposing disclosure requirements on Citizens
United because its history of producing films allowed the public to eval-
uate its messages.1 60 In so holding, the court relied on the Secretary's
justification for the media exemption that the public's familiarity with
the media enables sufficient evaluation of its reports and opinions.i1i In
fact, the court stated that the electorate would more easily be able to
evaluate a Citizens United documentary than an editorial in a newspaper
or magazine that does not frequently address controversial political top-
ics.162 The court further recognized that the "presence of ... exemptions
can cast doubt on the validity and extent of the asserted governmental
interest because the exemptions may indicate that the statutory command
is not based on the asserted interest but on a qualified, more narrow in-
terest."'63 Lastly, the court held that Citizens United's advertisements for
Rocky Mountain Heist did not fall under the exemption because it could
not show it was being treated differently than the media in respect to
advertisements.'64 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's
ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction and remanded with in-
structions to issue an injunction.165
155. Id. (citing Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. at 356-57).
156. Id. at 212 (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. at 352).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 213.
159. Id. at 215.
160. Id at 210.
161. Id. at 213-15.
162. Id. at 215-16.
163. Id. at 216.
164. Id at 217-18.




Circuit Judge Gregory A. Phillips authored an opinion concurring in
the judgment regarding the requirement that Citizens United comply with
the Colorado disclosure laws for the advertisements for Rocky Mountain
Heist, but dissented from the reversal of the district court's ruling that
Citizens United did not qualify for exemption from all other disclosure
requirements.166 In disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that Citi-
zens United be afforded exemption from the disclosure requirements,
Judge Phillips opined that the court was rewriting Colorado law to in-
clude additional exemptions without the authority to do So.167 He rea-
soned that the governmental interest in ensuring the electors are able to
determine the source of political messages and helping them to make
informed choices was sufficient to uphold the disclosure requirements.16 8
Judge Phillips criticized the court's as-applied analysis and recalled
the district court's statements regarding Citizens United's arguments that
seemed to focus on equal protection.169 He then went on to debase Citi-
zens United's claims under a First Amendment-Equal Protection legal
theory and reasoned that the court, in allowing Citizens United to be
treated as a media entity, second-guessed the Colorado voters' need for
information regarding donors.'70
Additionally, Judge Phillips determined that Citizens United was
not being treated differently than the exempted media, who would also
have to comply with the disclosure requirements were they to produce a
film considered an electioneering communication.171 He noted that news
organizations do not normally raise funds for electioneering communica-
tions or seek donations from subscribers in support of specific messag-
es. 172 Lastly, Judge Phillips disagreed with the majority's remedy and
opined that the appropriate action would be to "either sever the tradition-
al media's exemption from disclosure or strike the entire disclosure
scheme." He reasoned that the majority had written in a third category
of entities for exemption and risked increased case-by-case litigation.1 74
III. ANALYSIS
Following the drastic shift in campaign finance jurisprudence
marked by Citizens United I, disclosure laws were turned to as campaign
finance reformists' saving grace and as opponents' new challenge to
166. Id. (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id at 220.
170. Id. at 221.
171. Id at 221-22.
172. Id. at 222.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 222-23.
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eviscerate.'75 Moreover, as corporate America embraced its newfound
ability to influence elections through unlimited political spending, loop-
holes to disclosure laws were increasingly discovered and exploited.17 6
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Citizens United II opened yet an-
other door to the avoidance of campaign finance disclosure, increasing
implications of the growing ineffectiveness of disclosure requirements
and posing a greater risk to defeat the purposes behind the laws.177 This
Part first recognizes that Citizens United I's real legacy has been the im-
portance of disclosure. Next, it considers the existing loopholes to cam-
paign finance disclosure laws and their expansion following Citizens
United I. Lastly, this Part explores the numerous implications of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Citizens Unitedll.
A. Disclosure Becomes the New Focus
Disclosure has long been a central theme in regulating campaign fi-
nance. Justice Brandeis captured the essence of the underlying princi-
ple of disclosure in stating, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."7 9 Indeed, this oft-
quoted aphorism reflects the philosophy that disclosure sheds light on
situations to facilitate informed decision-making, to act as a deterrent,
and to uncover unlawful activity.iso Embraced as the last hope in
175. See Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 557 (2012) ("Everywhere you look, campaign finance
disclosure laws are under attack."); see also Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9
ELECTION L.J. 273, 297-98 (2010) (discussing "the power of the ever-more disclosure idea" sup-
ported by campaign finance reformists).
176. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 459-63 (discussing the narrowed disclosure re-
quirements applicable to organizations other than political committees following the FEC's 1980
independent expenditure rule and recognizing "[n]ow that following Citizens United corporations
and labor organizations were permitted to make independent expenditures, what had previously been
a flaw in the Commission's regulations ofvery limited applicability became a significant loophole").
177. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 222-23 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 670-71 (2011); Briffault, supra note
175, at 274-76; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 665-66 (2012);
Shepard, supra note 59, at 148.
178. See, e.g., Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 388 ("Mandated public disclosure of the
funds spent to influence elections has long been the 'essential cornerstone' of campaign finance laws
in the United States, and is widely recognized as 'fundamental to the political system."' (quoting
HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 164
(4th ed. 1992))).
179. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1932); Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
180. Although Justice Brandeis was discussing the centralization of financial power within a
few banks and the need for financial services regulations, his quote became the origin for the Sun-
light Foundation, a nonprofit organization that advocates for open government, and the Government
in the Sunshine Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b (2015)), which requires meetings of Government agencies to be open to the public. Addition-
ally, his statement became the rallying cry in support of campaign finance regulation. See Briffault,
supra note 175, at 273-74 ("Disclosure generally gets high marks from the public, academics, and
the courts. Opinion polls find very high levels of public support for campaign finance disclosure.
Among academics, both campaign finance reformers and campaign finance skeptics have endorsed
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strengthening the campaign finance laws following the landmark deci-
sion of Citizens United I, disclosure fittingly moved center stage.isi In
his 2010 State of the Union Address, President Obama cautioned that the
lift on the corporate independent expenditure ban would "open the flood-
gates for special interests--including foreign corporations--to spend
without limit in our elections."l8 2 The House of Representatives respond-
ed by passing the DISCLOSE Act, which was typified by the President
as allowing "the American people [to] follow the money and see clearly
which special interests are funding political campaign activity and trying
to buy representation.,,183
At the same time, disclosure laws also became the new focus of op-
ponents.184 The Senate shot down the DISCLOSE Act with the help of
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell who fervently opposed the Act.185
The Chamber of Commerce strongly opposed the Obama Administra-
tion's consideration of imposing disclosure provisions on federal con-
tractors regarding political donationsl8 6 as threatening to subject Ameri-
can businesses to government harassment.'8 7 Pressure built on the FEC to
impose disclosure requirements on super PACS, 8 8 and the agency faced
disclosure." (footnote omitted)); see also Ellen L. Weintraub & Alex Tausanovitch, Reflections on
Campaign Finance and the 2012 Election, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 541, 550 (2013) ("Disclosure is
one of the pillars of the Federal Election Campaign Act. In passing both the original Act and the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, it appears that Congress wanted every electoral message to con-
tain an identifiable source who can be held accountable by the public for the content of that mes-
sage.").
181. See Ortiz, supra note 177, at 663-65 ("As the debate stands today, reformers defend
disclosure as one of the few means left to discipline money in politics and help police against cor-
ruption, while deregulationists attack it as undermining the democracy its supporters claim it pro-
tects.").
182. Press Release, President Barack Obama, United States of America, Remarks by the Presi-
dent in State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
183. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, United States of America, Statement by the
President on the DISCLOSE Act (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-disclose-act.
184. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 388-89 ("Opponents of disclosure have recently
mounted numerous challenges to state and federal political disclosure laws . . . . [and] have increased
their public criticism of disclosure.").
185. See Floor Statement: Sen. Mitch McConnell on the DISCLOSE Act,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/17/politics/mcconnell-disclose-act-statement/ (last updated July 17,
2012, 8:54 PM); see also discussion supra Section IC.
186. Congress later "approved a provision in a spending bill that effectively killed the intent
behind the draft executive order. The language, which sets forth that campaign contribution disclo-
sure could not be required for companies bidding for federal contracts, has been reauthorized in
every appropriations bill since." Megan R. Wilson, Obama Urged to Impose Rules on Campaign
Spending Disclosure, THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/234437-obama-urged-to-impose-rules-on-campaign-spending-disclosure. Recent requests
for action would require disclosure only from companies that win federal contracts. Id.
187. See Coalition Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to President Obama (May 15,
2011), https://www.uschamber.com/letter/coalition-letter-president-obama-draft-executive-order; see
also Eric Lichtblau, Lobbyist Fires Warning Shot over Donation Disclosure Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/us/politics/27donate.html?partner-rss&emc=rss&_r-0.
188. See Robin Bravender, Dems: Crack Down on Super PACs, POLITICO (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:19
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/02/dem-senators-want-super-pac-crackdown-073136.
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attacks for gutting campaign finance law,189 but these views continued to
be strongly opposed.'90 Political groups filed multiple suits challenging
state campaign finance disclosure laws on constitutional grounds,'91 and
Target Corporation faced boycotts and protests after the public learned of
its donation to a political group that was considered to be anti-gay mar-
192riage.
Disclosure has also been in the spotlight of the campaign finance
policy debate.193 Some scholars have criticized disclosure laws for
chilling speech,19 4 posing a threat to privacy, 195 inadequately deterring
corruption or even exacerbating it,' 96 and ineffectively providing the pub-
lic with valuable information.'97 Others have argued that disclosure still
fulfills its intended purpose of providing voters with important infor-
mation, furthering the public interest,198 and solving the problem of quid
pro quo corruption.199 As evidenced by the ongoing debate, this focus on
disclosure is well-founded.
B. Expanding Loopholes to Disclosure
After the ban on corporate independent expenditures was invalidat-
ed, political spending skyrocketed particularly by "social welfare organi-
zations," which enjoy tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code and are not required to disclose donor infor-
mation. 200 Undisclosed spending by nonprofit groups topped $308 mil-
189. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The FEC is as Good as Dead: The New Republican Commis-
sioners are Gutting Campaign Finance Law, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andpolitics/jurisprudence/201 1/01/thefec_is_as good as dea
d.single.html.
190. See Luke Rosiak, Republicans Oppose Super PAC Disclosure, WASH. TIMES (June 20,
2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/20/republicans-oppose-super-pac-ad-
limits/.
191. See Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real-legacy-of-citizens-united-
case.html.
192. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political Contribu-
tions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703988304575413650676561696.
193. Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff 98
IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2013).
194. The chilling affects of compelled disclosure laws have been recognized to varying de-
grees. The concept that disclosure chills speech has become conventional wisdom. See id. at 1849.
195. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election
Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 873 (2011).
196. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 290-91; see also Michael D. Gilbert & Benjamin F.
Aiken, Disclosure and Corruption, 14 ELECTION L.J. 148, 154 (2015).
197. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REv. 255, 275 (2010).
198. See Hasen, supra note 175, at 559.
199. See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 103-04 (20 10).
200. "To be tax-exempt as a social welfare organization described in Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) section 501(c)(4), an organization must not be organized for profit and must be operated
exclusively to promote social welfare." Social Welfare Organizations, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Other-Non-Profits/Social-Welfare-Organizations (last
updated Nov. 18, 2015). "The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect partici-
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lion in the 2012 election cycle compared to $69 million in the 2008 elec-
tion cycle.20 1 These figures do not even account for donations by these
organizations to super PACs, which spent a total of $609 million in the
2012 election cycle but only $62 million in 2010.202 Even more telling is
the marked decline in transparency of outside spending-of the roughly
$1.03 billion spent by outside groups in 2012, an estimated 40.8% of the
sources of funds expended were publicly disclosed that year, while just
six years prior, an estimated 92.9% of outside spending was fully dis-
closed.203 Because this type of spending by 501(c)(4) organizations is not
subject to disclosure, commentators have labeled it "dark money."204
1. Political Committees and Super PACs
Organizations formed solely for the purpose of influencing candi-
date elections and those created specifically to raise funds to make inde-
pendent expenditures for that purpose, or super PACs, are subject to dis-
closure requirements and must remain independent of candidates and
political parties.2 05  Although, political committees, including super
PACs, are not required to ensure the original sources of their contribu-
tions are disclosed.206 Consequently, an avenue for avoiding disclosure
by passing contributions through super PACs evolved. Organizations and
207
individuals could form shell corporations to pass contributions through
to super PACs while disguising the original source of the funds from the
public.208 Moreover, because the timing of filing requirements can be
pation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public
office. However, a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization may engage in some political activi-
ties, so long as that is not its primary activity." Id. For a discussion regarding the major purpose test,
see infra Section IIIB.
201. Compare 2012 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt-V&disp=O&type=U
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016), with 2008 Outside Spending, by Group, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&chrt=V&disp=0&type=U
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
202. Compare 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016), with 2010 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
(last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
203. Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php?range=tot (las visited Jan. 23, 2016);
see also Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php?range=tothttp://www.opensecrets.org/ne
ws/reports/citizens united.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
204. See, e.g., Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 385.
205. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC (SpeechNow), 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (creating
the super PAC).
206. Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 461-62 (discussing the transparency flaws of the
FEC's disclosure rules).
207. Shell corporations are companies that lack significant assets or operations of their own
and, instead, serve as a vehicle for their owners to transact business through. See Richard Briffault,
Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 708-09 (2012).
208. See id (recounting several examples of the use of shell corporations to pass money
through to super PACs and avoid disclosure).
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manipulated by super PACs, donors could remain undisclosed until after
the corresponding election concluded.209
2. Social Welfare Organizations and the Major Purpose Test
Following Citizens United I, 501(c)(4) organizations became the
most attractive way for corporations to avoid disclosure of election con-
tributions.210 501(c)(4) status allows organizations formed for the pur-
pose of promoting social welfare to engage in substantial political activi-
ty while not being subject to disclosure requirements.211 Despite the In-
ternal Revenue Code's requirement that social welfare organizations
"operate[] exclusively for the promotion of social welfare,"2 12 the Treas-
ury Regulations do not prohibit such organizations from engaging in
political activity so long their "primary purpose" is not to influence can-
didate elections.2 13
Moreover, based on Buckley's narrowing of the term "political
committee," organizations whose major purpose does not involve influ-
214encing elections can avoid disclosure. Many practitioners argue that
the major purpose test, while not setting forth a particular numerical re-
quirement, is satisfied so long as an organization's political activity con-
stitutes less than 50% of its total expenditures.2 15 Because the major pur-
pose test has allowed organizations to engage in significant political ac-
tivity while avoiding disclosure, 501(c)(4) status has remained an ex-
216
ploited loophole in the campaign finance arena.
209. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463 ("For example, if a super PAC simply opted
for a monthly-as opposed to quarterly-reporting schedule, contributions to the super PAC made
leading up to the January 10, 2012 New Hampshire Republican Primary were not required to be
disclosed until the super PAC filed its January 31, 2012 disclosure report with the FEC.").
210. See Paul Blumenthal, 'Dark Money' in 2012 Election Tops $400 Million, 10 Candidates
Outspent by Groups with Undisclosed Donors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2012, 1:36 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-election-400-
million n 2065689.html.
211. "Due to the Court's narrowing of the term 'political committee' in Buckley to include
only those groups with the 'major purpose' of influencing elections, 501(c) groups could engage in
substantial political activity without risking triggering political committee status and its accompany-
ing disclosure requirements." Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463. Additionally, even though
501(c)(4) organizations must disclose the source of annual donations in the amount of $5,000 or
more to the IRS, the Agency is prohibited from making donor information public. Id. at 464 (citing
26 U.S.C. § 6033 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2006)).
212. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (2016).
214. Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 463.
215. Id. at 465; see also N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 678-79 (10th Cir.
2010) (applying the major purpose test to an organization involved in, among other activities, politi-
cal activity).
216. See Matea Gold, Groups Backed by Secret Donors Take the Lead in Shaping 2016 Elec-




3. Issue Advocacy and Earmarking
Even if an organization is subject to disclosure requirements, addi-
tional loopholes exist for avoiding such disclosure.2t 7 Although Citizens
United I relaxed the BCRA's definition of express advocacy or election-
eering communications regarding corporate spending, it found the defini-
tion applicable to disclosure essentially closing the decades old issue
advocacy loophole.2 18 Donors to political committees, however, can
avoid disclosure where the donor does not earmark its contribution for
independent expenditures or electioneering communications.2 19
For instance, in Citizens United I Secretary Scott Gessler discussed
his interpretation of Colorado's disclosure regulations.22 0 Any amount
spent toward producing an electioneering communication was not re-
quired to be disclosed.221 Further, donors would only need to be dis-
closed if their donation was earmarked specifically for an electioneering
222communication. Thus, "[i]f a donor permits the recipient to use the
donation for electioneering communications and other purposes, and the
entire donation could be used for the other purposes, the donor need not
be disclosed."22 3
While disclosures for independent expenditures are slightly more
rigid, donations must be disclosed only if directed to be used solely for
the purpose of attacking or supporting a Colorado candidate.224 Thus,
money donated to Citizens United for general use would not have to be
disclosed nor would a donation that was to be used at Citizens United's
discretion for films attacking or supporting candidates.225 Thus, the rules
regarding earmarking have allowed donors to relatively easily evade
disclosure.
217. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
218. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 700-03; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 129
(2003) (discussing the 1998 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Investigation), overruled by
Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The reports concluded "that the 'soft money loophole' had
led to a 'meltdown' of the campaign finance system that had been intended 'to keep corporate, union
and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process."' Briffault, supra note 207,
at 700 n.75 (quoting S. REP. No. 105-167, vol. 4, at 4611, 7515 (1998)). Additionally, courts have
upheld the applicability of disclosure requirements to "issue ads." See, e.g., Indep. Inst. v. Gessler,
71 F. Supp. 3d. 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2014) ("The Independence Institute seeks to change the dis-
tinction, to require an exception for 'pure issue advocacy' as compared to 'campaign related advoca-
cy.' Yet the plaintiff presents no authority that would require, let alone allow, this Court to find a
constitutionally-mandated exception for its advertisement on the grounds that it constitutes 'pure
issue advocacy."').
219. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
220. 773 F.3d 200, 204-05 (10th Cir. 2014).
221. Id. at 204.
222. Id
223. Id.
224. Id at 205.
225. Id
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4. Disclosure Exemptions
The Supreme Court first allowed for an exemption from campaign
finance disclosure in NAACP v. Alabama22 6 back in 1958. Later, relying
on NAACP, the Buckley Court held that an exemption would apply only
upon a showing that there was a reasonable probability that disclosure
would result in threats, harassment, or reprisals.227 This evidentiary
standard has remained high and difficult to satisfy, and although exemp-
tions from disclosure requirements have been sought over the years, they
have very rarely been granted.22 8
More recently press exemptions have afforded organizations, such
as Citizens United, another form of avoidance of disclosure regula-
tions.229 The Supreme Court considered whether a press exemption ap-
plied in MCFL based on its regular production of a newsletter and a spe-
cial edition that amounted to a campaign flyer.23 0 Because the special
edition was not comparable to any issue of the newsletter, the Court de-
clined to consider whether the newsletter qualified for press exemp-
* 231tion. Years later, the Court touched on the FEC's media exemption in
rejecting Austin's antidistortion argument232 recognizing that "[t]here is
no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corpo-
rations which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those
which are not."233
Nonetheless, following the decision in Citizens United I, the FEC
issued an advisory opinion that granted Citizens United press exemption
for both its film and the advertisements promoting its film. 234 The media
226. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
227. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
228. See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200-02 (2010) (holding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals despite the argument that
"once on the Internet, the petition signers' names and addresses 'can be combined with publicly
available phone numbers and maps,' in what will effectively become a blueprint for harassment and
intimidation" (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 46, Doe #1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (No. 09-559))).
229. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
230. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1986).
231. Id.
232. In Citizens United I the Court explained the antidistortion rationale as follows:
To bypass Buckley and Bellotti, the Austin Court identified a new governmental interest
in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest. Austin found a compelling govern-
mental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have lit-
tle or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."
Citizens United I, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (20 10)).
233. Id. at 352.
234. FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL 3184266, at *1-3 (June 11, 2010). Finding the
advertisements promoting the film were covered by the exemption, the FEC noted that "courts have
held that where the underlying product is covered by the press exemption, so are advertisements to
promote that underlying product." Id. at 6 (first citing FEC v. Phillips Pub., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1308,
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exemption became critically important to the court's decision in Citizens
United II.235 Considering the Secretary's broad interpretation of the ex-
emptions, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Citizens United qualified for
exemption based on its "extended history of producing substantial work,
comparable to magazines or TV special news reports," but the adver-
tisements promoting its films would still be subject to the disclosure re-
quirements.236 By following the FEC's lead, the Tenth Circuit expanded
the opportunity for organizations to avoid campaign finance disclosure
lessening the effectiveness of such disclosures. Consequently, the court's
decision further undermined the corresponding purposes of deterring
corruption and the appearance of corruption, discovering violations of
other campaign finance laws, and providing voters with vital infor-
mation.
C. The Implications of Citizens United v. Gessler
In Citizens United I, the Tenth Circuit leaned sharply against the
transparency movement and created an opportunity for endless organiza-
tions to bring as-applied challenges to disclosure laws, to qualify for ex-
emptions, and to eviscerate the line between the "press" and advocacy
groups seeking to influence elections.2 3 7 The court posed significant risks
to the effectiveness of campaign finance disclosure laws in four signifi-
cant ways: (1) by failing to consider the constitutionality of the media
exemption on its face; (2) by rejecting the Secretary's anticorruption
argument; (3) by concluding that the public would not further benefit
from the information that Citizens United's disclosures would provide;
and (4) by broadly interpreting the media exemption to cover Citizens
United.
1. The Refusal to Consider a Facial Challenge
Voters' distaste for the growing influence wealthy donors have on
politics and elections has become a central issue in the 2016 election
cycle.238 With spending "significantly outpacing recent election cycles in
contributions"23 9 and outside groups taking the lead, the 2016 presiden-
tial campaign will likely present all-time highs in terms of dollars ex-
pended. Based on the lack of action by the Internal Revenue Service
1313 (D.D.C. 1981); and then citing Reader's Digest Ass'n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210, 1215
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
235. 773 F.3d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 2014).
236. Id. at 206-07, 215-18.
237. See id; see also discussion infra Section C.3.
238. Matea Gold, Big Money in Politics Emerges as a Rising Issue in 2016 Campaign, WASH.
POST (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/big-money-in-politics-emerges-as-
a-rising-issue-in-2016-campaign/2015/04/19/c695cbb8-e5 Ic-Il e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html
(citing Daniel Weeks, executive director of the New Hampshire Rebellion, "a project to make money
in politics a major topic in the state's presidential primary").
239. See Editorial, Which Presidential Candidates Are Winning the Money Race, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/election-2016-campaign-money-
race.html?_r-0 (last updated Apr. 5, 2016).
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(IRS), the Department of the Treasury, and the FEC, proponents of cam-
paign finance reform have recently urged the Department of Justice to
get involved.24 0 As suggested by Circuit Judge Phillips, the court's as-
applied challenge was inappropriate in Citizens United II and risks future
case-by-case litigation where a considerably important and contentious
issue looms.241
According to the Coalition for Secular Government court, an as-
applied analysis-where a facial challenge can be and should be ad-
dressed-is offensive to the First Amendment itself.2 42 In so finding, the
court reasoned that failing to resolve the uncertainty precipitating the
litigation "chills robust discussion at the very core of our electoral pro-
cess."243 Based on this reasoning and recognizing the current landscape
of campaign finance disclosure, the Tenth Circuit has engendered further
uncertainty in place of providing critical guidance for political commit-
tees, their potential donors, and the public that relies on disclosure in-
formation in making crucial political decisions.
The Supreme Court, in Citizens United I, recognized the troubling
consequences of addressing an as-applied challenge in lieu of a facial
challenge in the context of campaign finance and First Amendment rights
where one speaker is potentially preferred over another.244 The Court
opined that drawing and redrawing constitutional lines on the basis of the
media used to distribute a particular speaker's political message would
necessarily compel continuous litigation and "create an inevitable, perva-
sive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech" in the interim.2 45 The
Court emphasized that under the First Amendment, courts must resolve
any doubts in favor of protecting speech rather than stifling it. 24 6
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Phillips concluded that the court should
have either struck down the disclosure scheme or severed the media ex-
240. See Press Release, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senate, Sen. Whitehouse Urges
DOJ to Take Action on Dark Money (July 15, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sen-whitehouse-urges-doj-to-take-action-on-dark-
money.
241. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 220 n.l (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I say that Citizens United hasn't made a traditional as-applied challenge because it admits
that the disclosure law would be valid against it if the law also applied against the exempted tradi-
tional media. By then arguing that the disclosure law becomes unconstitutional by treating traditional
media differently, Citizens United, in my view, veers to an equal protection challenge, not an as-
applied challenge under the First Amendment.").
242. Coal. for Secular Gov't v. Gessler, 71 F. Supp. 3d 176, 1178 (D. Colo. 2014).
243. Id.
244. See Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010) (declining to address Citizens United's
as-applied challenge to FECA's application to movies shown through video-on-demand and con-
cluding that "[s]ubstantial questions would arise if courts were to begin saying what means of speech
should be preferred or disfavored").
245. Id. at 326-27.
246. Id. at 327.
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emption.2 4 7 By instead providing Citizens United with an exemption
from campaign finance disclosure requirements, the Tenth Circuit creat-
ed a third category248 and drew a constitutional line based on the particu-
lar speaker's choice of media-those entities that the court determines
have "spoken sufficiently frequently and meaningfully . .. over an ex-
tended period of time."249 Moreover, the court left open what constitutes
speech that has been disseminated "sufficiently frequently" and "mean-
ingfully" and what period of time would qualify as "an extended period
of time."250 Rather than keeping with the legislature's determination of
what disclosure is needed to evaluate a speaker's message, the court has
251
weighed in on what should be left to the democratic process.
Because the court's as-applied approach has created such uncertain-
ty, absent filing suit on a case-by-case basis, no one will know who qual-
ifies for exemption from Colorado's campaign finance disclosure re-
252
quirements. Consequently, organizations are encouraged to challenge
the Secretary's determinations and the disclosure provisions' application,
donors may be reluctant to contribute, and voters will be left in the dark.
2. Deterring Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
Despite disclosure serving the governmental interest of deterring
corruption or the appearance of corruption for decades,253 the Citizens
United H court rejected the anticorruption rationale for reporting inde-
pendent expenditures.254 The court relied on Citizens United I's narrow-
247. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d 200, 222 (10th Cir. 2014) (Phillips, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson,
236 F.3d 174, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000)).
248. Id. ("But in my view, the majority takes a long stride toward lawmaking when it instead
takes a pen to Colorado's Constitution and statutes and writes in a nebulous third category of entities
that the Court believes have a First Amendment right o the same exemption because those entities
supposedly are sufficiently similar to traditional media.").
249. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
250. See id at 217 ("Finally, we cannot justify shirking our constitutional duty because of the
dissent's concerns about determining who qualifies for the media exemptions. To be sure, there
could be challenging questions about what entities are entitled to the same relief as Citizens United.
But those challenges are inherent in the exemptions expressed in Colorado law."). Accordingly, the
court should have addressed the disclosure scheme as a whole, in which case, Citizens United makes
an equal protection argument. See id. at 219-21 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). If the court were to find the disclosure exemption constitutional in this regard, the legislature
would be the proper avenue for emedying any statutory flaws.
251. See id at 222-23 ("1 would rather trust Colorado citizens to know when they need or do
not need disclosure to evaluate a speaker's message.").
252. Id.
253. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) ("[D]isclosure requirements
deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions to the
light of publicity."), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United 1, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (2014)
(concluding that disclosure requirements may "deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity" (quoting Buck-
ley, 424 U.S. at 67)).
254. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 211.
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ing of the anticorruption interest to direct contributions to candidates
excluding the rationale's applicability to independent expenditures.25 5 In
doing so, the court distinguished contributions and expenditures coordi-
nated with candidates-and those lacking such coordination-reasoning
that precisely because of the absence of prearrangement, independent
expenditures do not give rise to corruption.256 The court concluded that
this "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate."25 7 Thus, the need for
disclosure of such uncoordinated spending cannot be justified by an anti-
corruption rationale.25 8
On the contrary, the court's dismissal of the possibility of corrup-
tion through independent expenditures contradicts conventional wis-
dom 259 and current practices regarding "uncoordinated" independent
expenditures.260 With the rise of super PACs following Citizens United I
261
and SpeechNow, candidates flocked to assist with fundraising efforts,
and based on the relative ease with which independence from candidates
and political parties can be preserved under the FEC's regulations, it is
fairly simple for super PACs to keep their fundraising activities from
being deemed "coordinated."2 62
In fact, candidates are able to "endorse and solicit contributions for
groups that run ads benefitting their candidacy," and groups are permit-
ted to plan an ad's messaging with a candidate, as well as feature a can-
didate in an ad and target the candidate's electorate.2 63 Moreover, candi-
dates are free to attend super PAC hosted fundraisers and to use common
vendors including fundraising consultants.26 In addition, super PACs are
able to solicit contributions, potentially based off of a list of possible
donors provided by a candidate, from a candidate's friends and family
for amounts above the candidate's own ability.2 65
255. See id. at 211 (citing Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 356-57 (2010)).
256. Id
257. Id. (emphasis omitted).
258. See id.
259. See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 196, at 149 ("The theory that disclosure combats corrup-
tion has become conventional wisdom.").
260. See Note, Working Together for an Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with
Super PAC Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1484-87 (2015).
261. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). SpeechNow essentially created the super
PAC. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
262. See Potter & Morgan, supra note 15, at 460.
263. Id. at 461.
264. See Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 91,
96-97 (2013).
265. See DANIEL P. TOKAJI & RENATA E. B. STRAUSE, THE NEW SOFT MONEY: OUTSIDE
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Super PACs are also not required to determine or ensure the original
source of funds received are disclosed.26 6 Thus, individuals and corpora-
tions have disguised contributions to super PACs by passing funds
through shell corporations.2 67 Additionally, social welfare organizations,
like Citizens United, are able to avoid disclosure completely and even to
make transfers to super PACs engaged solely in independent expendi-
tures all the while allowing donors to go undisclosed to the public. 26 8
With the continually evolving avenues for avoiding disclosure, coordi-
nated efforts between organizations and candidates, which at least give
rise to the appearance of corruption, fly under the public's radar.
Perhaps even more concerning, coordinated activities between can-
didates and super PACs are reflected through single-candidate super
PACs, which one commentator argues are the "alter egos for the official
campaign committees of the candidates whom they existed to serve."269
According to one report, more than half of the super PACs operating in
2012 existed solely for the advancement of specific individual candidates
or were closely allied with a national party accounting for nearly 75% of
super PAC spending that year.2 70 These groups frequently maintained
"close structural relationships with the candidates they backed" and were
often organized and directed by the particular candidate's former staff-
271ers.
For instance, several of Mitt Romney's former aides formed Restore
Our Future; two of Barack Obama's former White House aides set up
Priorities USA Action; and Newt Gingrich's former press secretary and
spokesman served as a senior advisor for Winning Our Future, the
founder of which also used to work for a group Gingrich previously
ran.272 Moreover, numerous single-candidate super PACs and candidate
committees have relied on common vendors including "pollsters, media
266. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACS IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12, 22 (2013).
267. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Short-Lived Firm 's $IM Donation to GOP Fnd Raises Concerns
over Transparency, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/short-
lived-firms-I m-donation-to-gop-fund-raises-concern-over-
transparency/2011/08/04/glQAvczrulstory.htrml.
268. See, e.g., Robert Maguire, Obama's Shadow Money Allies File First Report,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/01/obamas-shadow-
money-allie/ ("One donor alone gave more than 80 percent of Priorities' total revenue in 2011, or
$1.9 million of about $2.3 million. . . . Whether the donors were corporations, individuals, unions or
other nonprofits that also don't have to disclose their donors is impossible to know from the form.").
269. See Briffault, supra note 264, at 91.
270. TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN, SUPER CONNECTED: OUTSIDE GROUPS' DEVOTION TO
INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES DISPROVES THE SUPREME COURT'S KEY
ASSUMPTION IN CITIZENS UNITED THAT UNREGULATED OUTSIDE SPENDERS WOULD BE
'INDEPENDENT,' at 9-10 (2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/super-connected-march-2013-
update-candidate-super-pacs-not-independent-report.pdf
271. Briffault, supra note 264, at 90.
272. Id. at 90-91 (citing Outside Spending Summary 2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php? cmte=C00490045&cycle=2012 (last visited
Apr. 19, 2016)).
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,273
buyers, television ad producers, and fundraisers." Even more telling,
super PAC contributors frequently have interests that would be impacted
by those that they are advocating for or against and have been "actively
engaged in lobbying over a wide range of tax, regulatory, and other legis-
lative issues."274
Super PACs are virtually coordinating with candidates on every
level.2 75 With the intended purpose of influencing elections and the prev-
alence of single-candidate super PACs, the reasoning that independent
expenditures do not give rise to corruption27 6 because of the lack of coor-
dination can no longer stand. At minimum, the aftermath of Citizens
United I has resulted in the appearance of corruption, which the Tenth
Circuit failed to even consider as a governmental interest in the disclo-
277sure requirements.
3. Providing the Public with Valuable Information
By concluding that the Secretary failed to show "a substantial rela-
tion between a sufficiently important governmental interest and the dis-
closure requirements that follow from treating Rocky Mountain Heist as
an 'electioneering communication' . . . under Colorado's campaign
laws,"278 the Tenth Circuit undermined the importance of providing vot-
ers with information regarding who is speaking and who is funding that
27
speech. Consequently, the court has provided organizations additional
opportunities to avoid disclosure regarding their funding sources and
further diminished the effectiveness of campaign finance disclosure laws.
The Citizens United II court first recognized that disclosure can
"help citizens make informed choices in the political marketplace."280
Additionally, the court opined that the disclosure requirements were not
expansive, noting the many limitations and the information required to
be disclosed only consisted of those donors who specifically earmarked
their contributions to be used toward electioneering communications or
273. Id. (citing T.W. Farnam, Vendors Finesse Law Barring 'Coordination' by Campaigns,
Independent Groups, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/vendors-finesse-law-barring-coordination-by-campaigns-
independent-groups/2012/10/13/69dcb848-f6d9-1 lel-8398-0327ab83ab91 story.html).
274. Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1691 (2012).
275. See id at 1669-70, 1680-82, 1685-87 ("To be sure, these oversized contributions are
going to committees that are technically independent of the candidates, and are not allowed to coor-
dinate their activities with the candidates. But in practice a committee is part of the campaign of the
candidate it is aiding." (footnote omitted)); see also Briffault, supra note 264, at 89-92 ("In virtually
all respects, then, these single-candidate Super PACs were alter egos for the official campaign com-
mittees of the candidates whom they existed to serve."); Note, supra note 260, at 1484-87 (discuss-
ing the growth of super PACs and their increased fundraising collaboration with candidates).
276. See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
277. See Citizens United 1, 773 F.3d 200, 211 (10th Cir. 2014).
278. Id. at 203.
279. See SpeechNow, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
280. Citizens United!!, 773 F.3d at 210 (quoting Citizens United , 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010)).
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independent expenditures. 28 Nevertheless, the court accepted that the
public would be able to properly assess statements made by the media
based on its familiarity with such sources as justification for the media
282
exemption.
Yet, the court acknowledged that the public could no longer count
on traditional media outlets for providing transparent, balanced, or objec-
tive information with accountability.2 8 3 If the media does not provide the
public with information transparently or accountably, How does sup-
posed familiarity with a source because of its periodic speech negate any
need for further information regarding who is behind that speech? The
electorate is left with nothing but its familiarity to determine who might
be attempting to influence its vote in an upcoming election? The court's
reasoning does not follow from decades of jurisprudence relying on the
interest of providing the public with information in upholding disclosure
284regimes.
Furthermore, in light of Citizens United I, greater significance has
been attributed to disclosure in regulating campaign finance28 5 with the
informational benefit serving as its most important function and pur-
286
pose. The court, however, determined that the electorate would not
benefit from Citizens United being subject to the disclosure requirements
that were intended to apply to electioneering communications such as
Rocky Mountain Heist.287 Instead, the court relied on Citizens United's
history of producing politically driven films as providing the public with
"the requisite context for its messages" and information "that is at least
as accessible to the public as donor lists reported to the Secretary."28 8
Can the messages of Citizens United's films actually provide the public
with the same information as its donor lists would provide?289 The con-
tent of these two different forms of information cannot be compared as
equal. Furthermore, as Circuit Judge Phillips noted, Citizens United had
never before produced anything focusing on Colorado politics or draw-
ing particular attention to Colorado.290
281. Id.at2ll-12.
282. Id. at 213-15.
283. See id at 212.
284. Even the Citizens United I court easily found the governmental interest of providing the
public with information was sufficiently important to justify infringing on speech through compelled
disclosure. Citizens United!, 558 U.S. at 367-71.
285. See Hasen, supra note 175, at 559 (arguing that "disclosure laws remain one of the few
remaining constitutional levers to further the public interest through campaign finance law").
286. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 258-59.
287. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 221 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I do not believe this Court acts within its proper sphere by second-guessing Colorado voters
about the information they need to evaluate express advocacy such as made in Rocky Mountain
Heist.").
288. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
289. "If voters know who puts their money where their mouth is, they will be able to make
more intelligent estimates about the policy positions of candidates." Hasen, supra note 175, at 571.
290. Citizens UnitedII, 773 F.3d at 222 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The court's conclusion that "[b]ecause Colorado has determined
that it does not have a sufficient informational interest to impose disclo-
sure burdens on media entities, it does not have a sufficient interest to
impose those requirements on Citizens United"291 cannot be reconciled
with the intent behind the campaign finance disclosure requirements
promulgated by the Colorado legislature and adopted by the state's citi-
zens.29 2 This irreconcilability reflects the implication that the purpose
behind the disclosure requirements has been degraded and the effective-
ness of providing the public with information diminished.
4. Interpreting the Media Exemption and Assessing its Validity
In validating corporations' limitless political spending ability in Cit-
izens United I, the Supreme Court remarked that media corporations, just
as other corporations, benefit from the corporate form in amassing im-
mense aggregations of wealth and express views that "have little or no
correlation to the public's support."293 The Court emphasized that there is
no legal support for distinguishing between corporations that re exempt
as media entities and those that are not and, again, "rejected the proposi-
tion that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond
that of other speakers."2 94 Thus, the Court suggested that the distinction
between media and non-media corporate speakers created by the exemp-
tion offends the Constitution and refused to consider whether Citizens
United qualified for such exemption.295
Yet, the Tenth Circuit considered just that in Citizens United l con-
cluding that the media exemption was applicable to the nonprofit organi-
296
zation. The court considered it reasonable for Colorado to provide a
media exemption on the grounds that the public has no informational
interest in disclosure by media entities because their history of reporting
and offering opinions affords the public adequate means to evaluate these
291. Id. at 216 (majority opinion).
292. See id. at 221 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Colorado voters
have determined at the ballot box that the identity of Citizens United's donors who earmark financial
contributions to produce or advertise a political film helps them evaluate the film's message.").
293. Citizens United 1, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruledby Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
294. Id. at 352 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing First Nat'l Bank
of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978))).
295. See id at 351-53. Although the Court discusses the media exemption to justify lifting the
ban on corporate independent expenditures, it also stressed the importance of disclosure laws and
reasoned that they "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities," and "d[o] not prevent anyone
from speaking." Id. at 366 (alteration in original) (first quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64
(1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citi-
zens United!, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); then quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201(2003), over-
ruled by Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). Accordingly, the application of disclosure regula-
tions to all speakers, including media corporations, would serve sufficiently important governmental
interests without imposing overly intrusive burdens. See id. at 366-67.
296. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 216.
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speakers.2 97 By accepting the Secretary's justification that the public
would be able to properly assess speech disseminated by the media based
on familiarity, the court essentially found that the exemption did not of-
fend the Constitution despite its earlier remarks that the First Amend-
ment does not provide greater protection based on the identity of the
speaker as part of the institutional press.298
Moreover, the court called into question the validity of the govern-
mental interest in the disclosure requirements "because the exemptions
may indicate that the statutory command is not based on the asserted
interest but on a qualified, more narrow interest."299 This doubt flies in
the face of the court's easy acceptance of the disclosures' importance in
"ensuring that Colorado's electors are able to discern who is attempting
to influence their votes."300 Then again, the court opined that the media
exemptions reflected Colorado's interest in disclosure based on the iden-
tity of the speaker.30 1 Indeed, the court essentially made an as-applied
determination based on equal protection grounds by considering whether
it would be unlawful to require Citizens United to disclose information
that the traditional media need not disclose.302
Recognizing the difficulty in determining whether various media
entities should be afforded exemption from disclosure, the court provided
little guidance regarding who will be covered by the media exemption
moving forward.303 The only relevant factor discussed by the court was
in regard to the frequency of which an entity disseminated information to
the public noting that "30-second sound bites" miss the mark.m Aside
from true "drop in" speakers, this interpretation of the media exemption
provides countless entities with a way out of disclosure. Can the public
really be expected to discern who is attempting to influence its vote
amongst the thousands of blogs, periodicals, cable broadcasters,
filmmakers, and radio talk shows that exist today? As the Supreme Court
recognized-"the line between the media and others who wish to com-
ment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred"305-this
line will soon be nothing more than a mirage.
297. See id. at 215-16.
298. See id at 212.
299. Id. at 216.
300. Id. at 210.
301. See id. at 217 ("Colorado's law, by adopting media exemptions, expresses an interest not
in disclosures relating to all electioneering communications and independent expenditures, but only
in disclosures by persons unlike the exempted media.").
302. Id. at 220 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("After hearing that
position, the district court remarked that '[i]t sounds like you're making an equal protection argu-
ment, and yet you keep telling us, no, we're not."' (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of
Record at 19:9-11, Citizens United v. Gessler, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (D. Colo. 2014) (No. 14-cv-
002266-RBJ), rev d, Citizens United II, 773 F.3d 200 (10th Cir. 2014))).
303. Id. at 215 (majority opinion).
304. Id.
305. Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
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In the wake of Citizens United I, disclosure remains as the predomi-
nant source of campaign finance regulation and continues to provide a
less restrictive means of regulating speech than alternative measures.30 6
With little else left in the campaign finance arena, loosening disclosure
requirements poses the significant risk of completely eviscerating the
entire campaign finance landscape. By adopting a broad interpretation of
the media exemption,3 07 the Tenth Circuit has provided yet another ave-
nue for avoiding disclosure and posed such a risk to the campaign fi-
nance scheme.
IV. CLOSING LOOPHOLES, COMBATTING CORRUPTION, AND THE VALUE
OF INFORMATION
While Citizens United I set the stage for the current state of dimin-
ishing campaign finance laws, it also turned the spotlight on disclosure as
a constitutionally valid means to regulating the influence of money on
politics. 308 The Supreme Court reinforced the importance and legitimacy
of disclosure as an effective balance to a campaign finance system that
allows for unlimited corporate independent expenditures, recognizing
that with the assistance of technology, citizens have access to timely in-
formation necessary to hold elected officials accountable.309 As an essen-
tial tool to combat the potential effects of striking down the corporate
expenditure ban, the Court laid the framework for the structural change
to the campaign finance landscape: "The First Amendment protects po-
litical speech; and isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency ena-
bles the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to
different speakers and messages."3 10
Hence, disclosure is critical to the field of campaign finance in light
of Citizens United I. Finding the proper balance to ensure the effective-
ness of disclosure in combating corruption and providing the electorate
with important information while protecting First Amendment rights and
encouraging unfettered iscussion is the challenge that lies ahead. As one
commentator has suggested, "'[r]ightsizing' disclosure to enable voters
to understand the financial forces behind our election campaigns requires
that we both raise the monetary thresholds for disclosure and extend the
ambit of disclosure to include the donors paying for independent spend-
ing." 311 This Part addresses possible ways to mend the damage done to
campaign finance regulation by proposing reforms to the information
required to be disclosed, disclosure-triggering thresholds, and the stand-
306. Id. at 369 (citing MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986)).
307. See Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 213-16.
308. See Briffault, supra note 177, at 667-68.
309. See Citizens United I, 558 U.S. at 370-71.
310. Id. at 371.
311. Briffault, supra note 207, at 690-91.
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ards regarding social welfare organizations, super PACs, earmarking,
and media exemptions.
A. Full-Disclosure v. Anonymity
On opposite ends of the spectrum, two predominant models for
campaign finance disclosure have been proposed and have garnered sup-
port: full-disclosure and anonymity.3 12
1. Deregulate and Disclose
The call to "deregulate and disclose" has gained significant atten-
tion in recent years. 313 Even traditional opponents of campaign finance
regulation have endorsed disclosure as a substitute for more restrictive
regulation.3 14 One of the main criticisms of full disclosure, however, re-
gards its practical effectiveness.1 Critics have noted that voters' actual
reliance on information is overstated.3 16 With the mass amount of infor-
mation flooding citizens' daily lives, it is unlikely that most citizens uti-
lize websites dedicated to campaign finance disclosure.3 17 Instead, voters
rely on news outlets for information regarding elections, which rarely
focus on campaign finance aside from the volume of contributions as an
318indication of who is winning the race. Moreover, disclosure laws have
recently allowed the concealment of the "giant influence of financially
and politically powerful entities," while exposing small-scale citizen
participation in campaign finance effectively defeating the informational
purpose behind the laws.319 Implementing a comprehensive disclosure
system impounds these absurd results. Endless, detailed information
312. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 100.
313. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 286.
314. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 663, 688 (1997).
315. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 101-02 ("First, there is substantial reason to question
whether the full disclosure model actually works as well in practice as it does in theory."); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 1705, 1727-28 (1999); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of
Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 24-29 (2003); Daniel R. Ortiz, The
Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REv. 893, 901-04 (1998).
316. See, e.g., Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 315, at 1717-18.
317. Raymond J. La Raja, Sunshine Laws and the Press: The Effect of Campaign Disclosure on
News Reporting in the American States, 6 ELECTION L.J. 236, 237 (2007).
318. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 288 ("Although today's enhanced disclosure has led to
marginally increased press coverage of campaign finance, press attention to campaign finance is still
very limited, and a good deal of the coverage that is provided tends to focus on the 'horse race'
aspect of campaign money-that is, what the volume of contributions and expenditures reveal about
the relative strengths of the candidates-rather than what the money says about the candidates'
backers or views."); see also McGeveran, supra note 195, at 863 ("In the past, disclosed data entered
general circulation only if conventional media outlets considered it especially newsworthy. Tradi-
tional news judgment involved choosing individual political actions of special relevance to highlight,
and surrounding this information with extensive context. This occurs rarely: even in jurisdictions
with strong campaign finance disclosure regimes, for example, newspapers publish very few stories
about political fund-raising." (footnote omitted)).
319. McGeveran, supra note 195, at 864 (arguing the "upside-down rules reached their absurd
climax" during the 2010 election cycle).
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about donors will become insurmountable-both minimizing the value of
information regarding influential donors and increasing privacy concerns
for small donors.
In particular, the detailed nature of full disclosure presents chal-
lenges that may be overly burdensome, which can, in turn, deter do-
nors.320 A full disclosure regime would mean more comprehensive and
detailed disclosure requirements, which would impose heavy burdens on
donors and would likely deter those wishing to make smaller donations
from doing so. 32 1 With the Internet and increased use of digital technolo-
gy, the landscape of disclosure laws has "qualitatively transformed."32 2
While the laws have remained the same, their effect has completely
changed-campaign finance data is easily accessible, searchable, sorta-
ble, and downloadable online-thus, anyone can quickly pull the contri-
bution information of their neighbors, friends, coworkers, and so on.3 23
Small donors are much more likely to be deterred to voice their political
beliefs through contributions knowing that their name, address, contribu-
tion amount, and oftentimes their employer will be disclosed online.32 4
Furthermore, the movement toward deregulating campaign finance
and requiring full disclosure relies too heavily on disclosure as a means
to prevent corruption. Although disclosure can deter corruption or the
325-
appearance of corruption, it does not-and will not-on its own ac-
complish this goal. For example, before unlimited soft money donations
were prohibited by Congress, which were subject to disclosure, political
party committees received an average of $375,000 in contributions from
some eight hundred individuals in the 2000 election cycle.326 Disclosure
did not deter these arguably corrupting donations.327 Rather, they in-
creased until they were prohibited by the BCRA.328 Likewise, wealthy
individuals continue to flood super PACs with large donations, which at
least give rise to the appearance of corruption despite being subject to
disclosure requirements.329
Standing alone, campaign finance disclosure laws cannot serve the
purpose of deterring corruption. Moreover, a full disclosure system de-
creases the value of disclosure by providing the public with an indiscern-
ible amount of information. Furthermore, it creates a chilling effect on
320. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 102-03.
321. See McGeveran, supra note 195, at 13-24 (discussing the privacy costs of disclosure).
322. Id. at I 1-12.
323. Id.; Briffault, supra note 175, at 290-91.
324. See Briffault, supra note 175, at 291.
325. See discussion supra Section 111.C.2.
326. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1182-83 (2002).
327. Briffault, supra note 175, at 286.
328. Id.
329. See discussion supra Section 111.C.2.
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speech of the majority of citizens who wish to or would typically make
small contributions in elections.
2. An Anonymous Donation System
The opposite approach to the full-disclosure model is to replace dis-
closure with a regime of anonymous donations or to establish a "secret
donation booth." To limit the influence of large donors, Professors Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres proposed the secret booth in their book Voting
with Dollars.330 This system is premised on the theory that politicians'
inability to verify the sources of political contributions would greatly
reduce the possibility for quid pro quo corruption, as complete anonymi-
ty makes it more difficult to sell access or influence.33 1 Similarly, some
scholars have asserted that full disclosure can exacerbate corruption ra-
ther than combat it because it provides candidates with potential donors'
detailed information and correspondingly provides donors with infor-
mation regarding who supports a particular candidate.332 This arguably
allows corrupt actors to identify those that may be more open to striking
a deal and facilitates their ability to assess each others' credibility
through voting and contribution records.333
The effectiveness of this model, however, would depend largely on
the operation and integrity of a blind trust, which could itself give rise to
corruption.3 34 Although Professors Ackerman and Ayres proposed many
precautions to address the risk of imperfect anonymity, such as "cooling-
off periods" allowing donors to revoke their donations within a specified
period of time and a "secrecy algorithm" preventing the blind trust to
which payments are made from crediting contributions all at once, per-
330. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). Voucher systems had previously been proposed, but
Ackerman & Ayres book drew attention as a paradigm shift to disclosure. See DAVID W. ADAMANY
& GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN AMERICA
189-92, 201-04 (1975) (proposing voucher systems); see also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1208-11 (1994)
(citing Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, AM.
PROSPECT (Spring 1993), http://prospect.org/article/crediting-voters-new-beginning-campaign-
finance) (comparing his proposal to a previous voucher proposal by Ackerman); Richard L. Hasen,
Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance
Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1996) (proposing a voucher plan).
331. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 330, at 6 ("The voting booth disrupts vote-buying
because candidates are uncertain how a citizen actually voted; anonymous donations disrupt influ-
ence peddling because candidates are uncertain whether givers actually gave what they say they
gave. Just as vote-buying plummeted with the secret ballot, campaign contributions would sink with
the secret donation booth.").
332. See Gilbert & Aiken, supra note 196, at 153-56.
333. See id. (noting that while disclosure "can raise the expected cost of corruption by increas-
ing the likelihood of detection . . . it can also raise the expected benefit by making conspirators more
confident that their counterparts will follow through and, more generally, by resolving information
asymmetries in the market for favors" in arguing that disclosure has "crosscutting effects").
334. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 330, at 99.
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fect anonymity is simply not possible.335 Of course, no system will meet
the expectation of perfection, but the risk "that the anonymity system
would break down, resulting in the worst of all worlds-one which the
contributors were known to the recipients but not disclosed to the public"
poses far too great of a threat to the integrity of elections.
This model would also provide little insight regarding the effect of
wealth on politics337 and largely ignores the important purpose behind
disclosure laws, specifically the informational value they provide the
electorate. Adopting a campaign finance system based on anonymity
would result in a complete loss of information regarding contributions,
cutting off the voters' ability to "follow the money [to] see clearly which
special interests are funding political campaign activity,",338 which the
Supreme Court has consistently found to serve an important interest that
allows the electorate to evaluate candidates.3 39
B. A More Balanced Approach
Although the full-disclosure and anonymity models for reform pre-
sent valid arguments, to protect the First Amendment rights of political
speakers and to enable voters to make informed decisions through trans-
parency, a more balanced approach is necessary. To effectively address
the loopholes provided by current disclosure laws, including earmarking,
the major purpose test, coordination with super PACs, fund pooling, and
press exemptions, comprehensive reform efforts on both the federal and
state level need to take place. First, to provide voters with the most valu-
able information, large contributions should require more detailed disclo-
sure while disclosure regarding smaller donations should be focused on
aggregated data. Furthering this goal, disclosure triggering thresholds
should be raised, and guidelines surrounding social welfare organizations
require amendments. Lastly, earmarking provisions, coordination stand-
ards, and media status parameters should be redefined.
335. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Voting with Votes, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1971, 1985-94 (2003)
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002), and recognizing the importance of a contributor's reputation in estab-
lishing trust with candidates, allowing a credibility assessment to accurately determine who is a
contributor to the candidate's campaign).
336. Id. at 1994 ("It is therefore especially disappointing that Ackerman and Ayres do so little
to explore the foundations of their proposals and that they rely on relatively wooden conceptions of
human conduct and motivation, thereby missing some of the most interesting questions raised by
their proposals.").
337. See Noveck, supra note 199, at 106.
338. Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 183.
339. See, e.g., Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010).
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1. Aggregate Data of Small Donor Information
Several scholars have recently proposed aggregate data as an alter-
native to individual donor information.34 0 For example, rather than focus-
ing on a contributor's name and address, aggregate statistics could be
compiled based on "more general characteristics, such as the donor's
occupation, income bracket, race, or geographic region."34 1 Additional
aggregate statistics regarding percentages of donations based on different
data sets, such as political party affiliation, could also provide voters
with helpful information in evaluating candidates.3 42 This type of infor-
mation avoids providing specific donor identifying information, which
prevents quid pro quo corruption, the risk of harassment or retaliation
and, thus, chilling speech.343 Moreover, the personal information of the
vast majority of contributors does not likely provide the vast majority of
voters with any real educational value because most contributors are rela-
tively unknown to the public. 3
Instead, providing voters with data sets aligns the information dis-
seminated with the candidate rather than the contributor, which will
prove more valuable in educating voters.345 For example, if a candidate
or political group is heavily supported by out of state contributors, or
large food corporations rather than local farmers, or employees of the
tobacco industry, voters can use these heuristic cues to assess the candi-
date or group's policy positions. Whereas, individual contributors' names
and addresses on their own provide voters with little to no insight.34 6
While some intermediary organizations filter, sort, and publish contribu-
tor information in data sets, they can easily selectively highlight certain
information to further a particular agenda or bias.347 At the same time,
"[a]ggregate disclosure can provide a rich and valuable source of politi-
cally relevant information . . . [including] information on patterns of po-
litical support that may prove insightful to both voters and policymakers
alike."348 To ensure accurate, unbiased, and consistent publication of
aggregated data, collection and dissemination should be handled by fed-
eral and state agencies through reporting reforms.
340. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 175, at 276 ("Campaign finance reports should be treated
more like Census data or income tax returns, with the focus for the most part not on the activities of
specific individual donors and more on the behavior of demographic or economic aggregates.").
341. Noveck, supra note 199, at 106.
342. See id at 107-08.
343. See id at 108-10.
344. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 265-66.
345. See id at 267.
346. See id
347. See id at 268-70; see also La Raja, supra note 317, at 248.
348. Noveck, supra note 199, at 108.
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2. Higher Thresholds, Original Source Disclosure, and Earmarking
In a similar vein, to provide the electorate with information useful
in determining candidates' and groups' policy positions and what special
interests are attempting to influence elections, disclosure triggering
thresholds should be raised.34 9 As the Tenth Circuit and Colorado courts
have suggested, there is little educational value in providing voters with
donor information regarding small donors and ballot-issue committees
expending relatively small amounts.3 50 Additionally, small contribution
amounts pose little potential of corruption but are more apt to expose
donors to retaliation, threats, and harassment.35' Significantly higher
thresholds will ensure that the most influential donors, which will pro-
vide the electorate with more important information, are captured.352
Donations at these higher levels would warrant more detailed disclosure
requirements, beyond aggregate reporting, as the majority of voters are
more likely to be familiar with wealthy individuals, celebrities, and issue
organizations contributing large amounts and, thus, more readily able to
utilize the information in their decision-making.5
Perhaps even more essential to effective disclosure, with campaign
funds increasingly being moved through independent committees, all
campaign spending by such committees should be traceable to the origi-
nal source.354 Those contributions above the threshold and utilized in
support of independent expenditures or electioneering communications
should be subject to disclosure. In addition, because these social welfare
organizations are being used as conduits for donations to super PACs,
requiring disclosure of these donations is equally important.355 Thus,
disclosing the original source for applicable spending above correspond-
ing thresholds should also be required. Because the IRS has failed to
349. Several scholars have called for higher thresholds and recognized that the identity of
contributors making small donations does not provide the electorate with sufficiently helpful infor-
mation. See id. at 107; see also Mayer, supra note 197, at 280-81; Briffault, supra note 207, at 690-
91; McGeveran, supra note 315, at 53-54; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Re-
form, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 327 (1998).
350. See, e.g., Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding the bur-
dens of compliance did not warrant the disclosure of small expenditures by a ballot-issue commit-
tee).
351. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 283; see also McGeveran, supra note 195, at 873-78.
352. Thresholds should be based on research and current spending norms and adjusted for
inflation on an annual basis. One commentator has suggested a donor who makes a donation of more
than $10,000 to an independent committee or more than a threshold fraction of the committee's
funds should be subject to disclosure requirements. Briffault, supra note 207, at 709.
353. See Mayer, supra note 197, at 265-66 ("[A] voter might be able to use the fact that, for
example, Jane Fonda or Rush Limbaugh contributed to a particular candidate's campaign or to an
organization that opposed a particular candidate to intuit correctly something about the relevant
candidate's qualifications for office or policy positions . . . .").
354. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 707-10 ("With limits on spending by and donations to
independent committees gone, disclosure of the individuals behind the independent committees
becomes more critical.").
355. Id. at 685-87.
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adopt amendments to the 501 (c)(4) guidelines,3 56 and the FEC is not like-
ly to amend current guidelines concerning the independence of super
PACs,357 these original source disclosures will work to combat pooling
efforts of wealthy individuals and to close the existing loopholes that
allow dark money to increasingly influence elections.
Lastly, earmarking standards should be applied in an opt-out fash-
ion rather than an opt-in fashion. Hence, rather than allowing donors to
avoid disclosure unless they specifically earmark their donations to be
used in support of electioneering communications or for independent
expenditures, any donations that do not opt out of such electoral activi-
ties would be subject to disclosure so long as they are above the corre-
sponding threshold.3" This distinction would make it more difficult to
avoid disclosure by funneling donations through social welfare organiza-
tions. In conjunction, raising threshold amounts, requiring social welfare
committees and super PACs to disclose original donors, and redefining
standards for earmarking will provide for more effective and comprehen-
sive disclosure of important campaign finance information and plug the
existing gaps in current election laws.
3. Interpreting Press Exemptions
Lastly, the FEC and the Tenth Circuit's broad application of the
media exemption to Citizens United35 9 is problematic and does not allow
for practical application of the exemption in future cases. In Citizens
United I, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]here is no precedent sup-
porting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations which are
deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not."360
Moreover, the Court recognized that "the advent of the Internet and the
decline of print and broadcast media" further blurred "the line between
the media and others who wish to comment on political and social is-
sues."36' With this line continuing to blur as social media and blogs rise
as outlets for political speech, the legal categorization of press entities
will continue to present challenges.
356. The IRS proposed amendments in 2013, which would have redefined the "exclusive"
versus "primarily" discrepancy, but after receiving a record amount of comments during the notice
and comment period, failed to adopt the proposal. See generally Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social
Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71535-01 (proposed
Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
357. See Briffault, supra note 207, at 686 (discussing the independence of super PACs from
candidates as meaning "that they are barred from consulting with candidates concerning the specifics
of the decisions of which ads to air and what to say in those ads").
358. See id at 698 (suggesting issue committees set up non-electoral spending accounts, which
could not be used for electoral spending and would not be subject to disclosure, allowing donors to
opt out of disclosure).
359. See FEC Advisory Op., No. 2010-08, 2010 WL 3184266 (June I1, 2010); see also Citi-
zens United II, 773 F.3d 200, 213-15 (10th Cir. 2014).
360. Citizens Unitedl, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010).
361. Id.
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The reasoning applied in Citizens United 11 does not provide a
workable framework for evaluating whether an entity qualifies for the
exemption.36 2 Relying on the public's "ability to evaluate the credibility
of a particular message"363 to determine an entity's status forces courts to
second-guess the public's judgment on a case-by-case basis.36 Moreo-
ver, the press exemptions make little sense in light of current campaign
finance disclosure. As Circuit Judge Phillips noted in Citizens United II,
media organizations do not normally engage in electioneering communi-
cations or make independent expenditures and would be subject to the
same disclosure requirements in advertising such express advocacy piec-
es.365 Furthermore, should the Court find media exemptions to be uncon-
stitutional, as it suggested in Citizens United 1,366 they should be severed
from disclosure laws and media corporations should be treated the same
as non-media corporations.
CONCLUSION
Political speech is at the core of the First Amendment protections
reflecting our "profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."36 7
This constitutional guarantee is most applicable to political campaign
activity because the ability of the electorate to make informed decisions
is essential as "the identities of those who are elected will inevitably
shape the course that we follow as a nation."368
Based on the current landscape of campaign finance regulation, ef-
fective disclosure schemes on both the federal and state level are critical
to ensuring that the electorate has the information necessary to make
these important decisions. In the wake of Citizens United I and the Tenth
Circuit's recent decision in Citizens Unitedl, disclosure reform is of the
utmost importance as political spending, particularly dark money, con-
tinues to rise with another election on the horizon. In particular, in Citi-
zens United II the court improperly granted the organization media ex-
emption resulting in additional opportunities for entities to avoid cam-
paign finance disclosure. In consequence, the court's decision under-
mined the purposes behind disclosure regulations and has risked mini-
mizing the effects of such regulations.
362. Citizens United II, 773 F.3d at 214.
363. Id.
364. See id. at 221-23 (Phillips, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365. See id. at 222.
366. 558 U.S. at 351-54.
367. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
368. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United !, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Monitor Patri-
ot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-73 (1971).
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By raising thresholds and limiting disclosure in regard to small do-
nors to aggregated data, along with requiring social welfare organizations
and super PACs to disclose the original sources of their donations, and
redefining earmarking and media exemption standards, existing loop-
holes that allow increasing amounts of donations to go undisclosed can
be closed. Consequently, campaign finance disclosure laws would serve
their intended purpose of combatting corruption, detecting contribution
violations, and providing the public with important information in evalu-
ating political candidates.
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